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In this dissertation, I explore the underlying mechanisms through which a firm innovates 
and invests in Research and Development (R&D). It consists of two essays.  
The initial essay investigates the effects of aggregate stock market liquidity on innovation 
at both the aggregate and firm levels for publicly traded firms in the U.S., and shows a 
significant and positive effect at both levels of aggregation. Next, the essay provides two 
underlying mechanisms through which aggregate stock liquidity enhances innovation. 
First, high stock market liquidity reduces the cost of raising external capital, making it 
easier for firms, especially for small firms and those with R&D investments, to issue 
equity and finance their innovations. Second, high stock market liquidity generates high 
firm valuation and reduces transaction costs, motivating large firms to buy the 
innovations of small firms through merger and acquisition activities. Overall, this essay 
documents that aggregate stock market liquidity plays a very important and positive role 
in enhancing aggregate innovation. 
The second essay examines how a firm makes investment decisions under uncertainty. 
Real option theory predicts an inverse relationship between corporate investment and 
uncertainty, because investment is (at least partially) irreversible and uncertainty 
increases the value of the option to wait. In contrast, the strategic growth option 
framework shows that uncertainty may encourage investment in growth options since the 
value of the option to wait is drastically eroded due to competition and an initial 
investment can confer greater capacity to take advantage of future growth opportunities. 
Consistent with the strategic growth option analysis, this essay documents that firms will 
invest more in R&D when facing high uncertainty. The reason is that R&D investments 
ix 
 
can potentially generate growth opportunities which enhance competitive advantages for 
firms in the future. The study further shows that the switch of more R&D investments 
and less capital expenditures is more pronounced for firms with fewer real options, i.e., 
firms that are large, less innovative, or firms in more competitive industries. Finally, this 
essay documents that these strategic advantages are important factors to derive the 




CHAPTER 1: STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY AND INNOVATION ACTIVITY 
1.1 Introduction 
A wide literature documents the important role of financial markets in enhancing firm 
innovation and the contribution of innovation to economic growth (e.g. Hall et al. 
(2011)). However, locating the channels through which these markets effect innovation, a 
major driver of economic growth, has been controversial (Brown et al. (2009)). In this 
paper, I investigate the effects of stock market liquidity on innovation at both the 
aggregate and firm levels for publicly traded firms in the U.S. This topic is important to 
market participants including regulators because stock market liquidity can be altered by 
changes in investor behaviors, firm decisions and/or financial market regulations; such as 
the change in disclosure requirements, deregulation of stock commission or reduction of 
tick size. 
As a preliminary inquiry, Figure 1 plots the aggregate U.S. stock liquidity based on 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and the aggregate number of patent applications by 
publicly traded firms on the CRSP database from 1975 through 2006. The figure shows 
that the U.S. stock markets have become more liquid and that the number of patent 
applications has increased gradually through 2002, when the tech bubble burst, and 
beyond. These patterns suggest a positive relationship between aggregate stock market 
liquidity and aggregate innovation for all publicly traded firms in the U.S during this 







Figure 1: Stock Market Illiquidity and the Number of Patent Applications 
Notes: This figure shows time-series plots of the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (AgLIQ) and the number of patent applications for firms 
with CRSP data over the period 1975 to 2006. The gray bars are the number of all patents (in thousands) in a year (the left axis). The line is the AgLIQ 
(the right axis). Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is first calculated for each firm for each year. Then the value –weighted cross-sectional average for 




















Stock market illiquidity and number of  patent applications  
Number of patent applications (thousands)
Aggregate llliquidity (right axis)
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There are two reasons to hypothesize that stock market liquidity enhances innovation for 
publicly traded firms. First, several asset pricing models show that an improvement in 
aggregate stock market liquidity leads investors to require a lower liquidity risk premium, 
thus reducing the cost of equity capital. This makes it easier for firms, especially for 
small firms and innovative ones, to finance their innovation (see, e.g., Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Liu (2006), and Amihud, Mendelson, 
and Pedersen (2005)).
1
 This is an important factor because, as Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (2009) point out, “young publicly traded firms finance R&D investments almost 
entirely with internal or external equity. For these firms, information asymmetry, highly 
uncertain returns, and lack of collateral value likely make debt a poor substitute for 
equity finance.” 
2
 Thus, when stock market liquidity is high, the cost of capital for 
investing in R&D is relatively low, allowing firms to invest more in innovation. 
Second, higher stock market liquidity increases firm valuation and reduces transaction 
costs, which motivates large firms to buy innovation from small firms through merger 
and acquisition activities. On the one hand, aggregate liquidity reduces transaction costs 
and reallocates assets in the economy more efficiently, which results in merger waves 
(Harford (2005)). On the other hand, when stock markets become more liquid, the 
rewards of investing in R&D are high since investors would assign a higher present value 
to potential future cash flows generated from investing in R&D. Because the large firms 
cannot prevent small firms from “trying to successfully obtain the innovation first,” they 
still have an option of buying the innovation from the small firms (Phillips and Zhdanov 
                                                          
1
 Butler et al. (2005) also find that both flotation costs and investment bank fees will be reduced when firm 
stock liquidity increases. They also suggest that stock liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of 
raising external equity capital. 
2
 See also Atamassov et al. (2007). 
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(2012)). In this case, large takeover premiums are the targets’ major incentive for 
investing in R&D. Indeed, Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) demonstrate that “an active 
acquisition market encourages innovation, particularly by small firms in an industry since 
large firms can optimally outsource R&D investment to small firms and then acquire 
those that successfully innovate.”  
My hypotheses suggest the following four testable predictions. First, aggregate 
innovation – as proxied by the numbers of patents
3
 and aggregate R&D investments by 
publicly traded firms in the U.S. – should increase with aggregate stock market liquidity.
4
 
Next, since the effects of stock market liquidity on external financing is more pronounced 
for small firms or innovative ones, I hypothesize that the R&D investment sensitivity to 
aggregate liquidity should be stronger for small firms and firms with R&D investments. 
Third, if merger and acquisition activities can enhance R&D investments, merger and 
acquisition activities with innovation are expected to increase when stock market 
becomes more liquid. Finally, I expect that stock market liquidity will enhance firm 
innovation captured by the number of patents, patent citation and R&D investments. 
In this paper, I test these predictions, using stock information from the CRSP database to 
calculate liquidity measures, both the number of patents granted by USPTO as well as 
                                                          
3
 Number of patent citations is one of the most important measures of the importance of a particular patent. 
However, Hall et al. (2005) document that “citation counts are inherently truncated, since patents continue 
to receive citations over long periods (in some cases even after 50 years)”. “Moreover, patents applied for 
in different years suffer to different extents from this truncation bias in citations received, and hence their 
citation intensity is not comparable and cannot be aggregated”. Thus, I only examine the effects of stock 
market liquidity on patent citation at the firm level. 
4
 Patenting activity is considered a better proxy for innovation and R&D investments because it brings 
several benefits to a firm. First, it measures innovation output and captures the effectiveness of innovative 
processes. Second, it also enhances a firm’s competitive advantage because it is hard to imitate (Lengnick-
Hall (1992)). Moreover, patenting activity tends to increase firm value. Hall et al. (2005) document that 
innovation captured by R&D expenditures, patent count, and patent citation significantly affect the market 
value of a firm, “with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%”. 
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patent citation to firms in the CRSP database
5
 and R&D expenditures of firms in 
COMPUSTAT to capture firm innovation. Because patent application is considered a 
better proxy for innovation, I mainly focus on the effects of aggregate liquidity on 
aggregate innovation captured by patenting activity in the period from 1976 to 2006
6
.  I 
also robustly check the sample period back to 1955. Since neither the aggregate 
innovation level nor the liquidity of the stock market are stationary processes and neither 
have obvious trends, I detrend these time series before testing my predictions.  
I find that stock market liquidity enhances aggregate innovation for publicly traded firms 
in the U.S. I also document that the relationship between aggregate liquidity and 
aggregate R&D expenditures is stronger for small firms, consistent with my hypothesis 
that small firms tend to invest more in R&D when stock markets become more liquid. 
My study also shows that aggregate liquidity is significantly positively correlated with 
the merger and acquisition deals with patents as well as with the number of targets with 
patents. Furthermore, the effect of aggregate liquidity on the aggregate number of patents 
is stronger for large firms, which is consistent with my hypothesis that high aggregate 
liquidity makes it easier for large firms to buy innovation from small firms. My findings 
are consistent with the finding by Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) who develop a model to 
show that large firms optimally decide to purchase small innovative firms.  
As documented in the literature, aggregate liquidity may be endogenous with aggregate 
innovation.  I am primarily interested in the predictive power of aggregate liquidity for 
                                                          
5
 I thank Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman for making the data available. The data is available at 
https://iu.box.com/patents. 
6
 As mentioned in Hall et al. (2001, 2005, and 2009), there is the patent truncation problem at some ending 
years of the database. Thus, I use four year-lag of the data period to make sure that almost applied for 
patents are shown in the database.   
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aggregate innovation, but there is also the possibility of causality going in the opposite 
direction.  I examine this issue directly by performing Granger causality tests. My results 
show that aggregate liquidity does Granger cause aggregate innovation growth rate but 
aggregate innovation growth rate does not Granger cause aggregate liquidity for the 
whole sample from 1976 to 2006.  
In addition to the Granger causality tests, I use several methods to deal with the 
endogeneity problem in the relationship between aggregate liquidity and innovation. 
First, I exclude firms in computer and internet related industries because the development 
in these industries highly makes stock markets more liquid. I then examine the effects of 
stock market liquidity on aggregate innovation from non-computer and internet related 
firms. I find that this effect is stronger than the effect of aggregate liquidity on aggregate 
innovation for all publicly traded firms. Second, an improvement in stock market 
liquidity could encourage firms to issue more equity to finance their innovation projects. 
Thus, I expect that the effects of aggregate stock liquidity on aggregate innovation to be 
more pronounced for publicly traded firms than for non-publicly traded firms and other 
sectors. My results are consistent with this prediction. 
Another important method to solve the endogeneity problem is to examine the effects of 
liquidity shock on firm innovation. Using a difference–in–difference methodology, Fang 
et al. (2013) find that the decimalization of the minimum price variation in 2001 
negatively affected firm innovation. However, the underlying assumption of this model is 
that the macroeconomic conditions equally affect both types of firms (firms are placed 
into either a treatment or control group). This assumption seems incorrect because the 
years around decimalization 2000-2002 were the years when the tech bubble burst and 
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the economy slowed. During this period, innovative firms or firms in high tech industries 
could be more affected by the collapse of the tech bubble. Further, since the patent data is 
censored at zero, comparing the absolute value of the change in firm innovation seems 
inappropriate. For example, a treatment firm had 4 patents in 2000 and 2 patents in 2002 
while control firm had 1 patent in 2000 and 0 patent in 2002. During this period, the 
change in innovation for a treatment firm is -2 patents and for a control firm is -1. This 
does not necessarily mean that a treatment firm would be less innovative than a control 
firm. Therefore, Dass et al. (2012) point out that the method used in Fang et al. (2013) 
contains some weaknesses
7
 and suggest that the lag innovation should be controlled when 
examining the effects of liquidity on innovation. After controlling for lag innovation, 
Dass et al. (2012) show that liquidity is positively related with firm innovation. 
Borrowing part of the methodology from Dass et al. (2012), I re-examine the effects of 
liquidity shock around the decimalization year of 2001 on firm innovation. I also extend 
this approach by investigate the effects of liquidity shock around the tick size reduction 
year of 1997 on the change in firm innovation from 1996 to 1998 and from 1996 to 1999. 
I show that the reduction in tick size enhances firm innovation. 
Using panel regressions on individual firms, I further show that, after controlling for firm 
characteristics, stock market liquidity has a significantly positive impact on firm 
innovation. More interestingly, after controlling for aggregate liquidity, the effects of 
stock liquidity on innovation at the firm level documented in the literature (e.g. Ferreira 
et al. (2012), Fang et al. (2013)) becomes mixed, depending on regression specifications. 
As discussed by Dass et al. (2012), the results shown in Fang et al. (2013) hold only 
                                                          
7
 More details can be found in Dass et al. (2012) 
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when lag innovation is not included in the model. Thus, the cross-sectionally negative 
relationship between liquidity and firm innovation shown in Fang et al. (2013) could 
reflect that small firms, which tend to be less liquid, may be more innovative than large 
firms, especially when endogenous relationship between firm innovation and stock 
liquidity is not eliminated. Furthermore, if small firms need to be more innovative to 
attract large firms to buy innovation from them, this problem could also reflect that, 
instead of being innovative themselves, large firms (with higher stock liquidity) have an 
option of buying other firms’ innovation (Phillips and Zhdanov (2012)). 
Using the sample period from 1976 to 2002 and controlling for lag innovation, I 
document that firm stock liquidity is positively related to firm innovation. Further, the 
positive relation between firm’s stock liquidity and firm innovation is more pronounced 




My essay makes several contributions to the literature. First, the essay shows an 
important role of stock markets in innovation and economic growth. My evidence 
partially explains why some developed countries can generate a large number of patents 
and have experienced long-run economic development. Second, I document that stock 
market liquidity is an important determinant of firm innovation, especially for small firms 
and firms with R&D investments. Third, these findings suggest a channel that links stock 
markets to firm valuation.  
                                                          
8
 Dass et al. (2012) show that their results are more appropriate and robust than Fang et al.’s (2013). 
Moreover, because the years of decimalization 2000-2002 were years of the bursting of the “dot.com 
bubble”, they show that the change in patent applications is strongly related to the prior level of patenting 
activity and “not including lagged levels would bias the results.”  
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To the best of my knowledge, this is the first essay to examine the effect of stock market 
liquidity on innovation at both aggregate and firm levels. Fang et al. (2009) find that 
stock liquidity can increase firm performance and valuation. Hall et al. (2005) document 
that both patent count and patent citation significantly affects market value and an extra 
citation per patent can boost market value by three percent. I fill this gap by documenting 
that stock market liquidity can generate more innovation and, as a result, this innovation 
will increase firm valuation.  
The recent literature (e.g. Dass et al. (2012), Ferreira et al. (2012), and Fang et al. (2013)) 
also examines the relation between stock liquidity and firm innovation. However, 
different from these papers, I measure stock liquidity at the aggregate level and focus on 
the effects of the market stock liquidity on aggregate innovation in the economy.  
My essay is also different from the studies by Fang et al. (2013) in that I use a longer 
database and also deal with the patent truncation problem as well as consider the 
endogeneity in the innovation process. I also posit two channels by which stock market 
liquidity may affect firm innovation; financing and M&A activities. First, an 
improvement in stock market liquidity will reduce the cost of raising external capital and 
encourage firms, especially small firms or innovative ones, to issue more equity to 
finance their innovation.  
Second, stock market liquidity will increase merger and acquisition activities which are 
substantial to push innovation. I also document that both mechanisms could drive the 
different effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate innovation for each type of firms. I 
find that the relation between aggregate liquidity and aggregate R&D expenditures is 
stronger for the group of small firms due to the financing mechanism. However, the 
10 
 
effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate number of patents are more pronounced for 
the group of large firms because high stock market liquidity makes it easier for large 
firms to acquire small innovative firms. Moreover, high stock market liquidity also 
generates large takeover premiums which create strong incentives for small firms to be 
innovative and eventually become takeover targets. My evidence shows that stock market 
liquidity play an important role in enhancing innovation, and thus suggests the link 
between finance and economic growth. 
My essay is also related to two strands of literature: the literature on the relation between 
stock liquidity and cost of capital (e.g. Butler et al (2005)), and the literature on the 
relation between merger and acquisition and innovation (e.g. Ahuja and Katila (2001), 
Zhao (2009), Phillips and Zhdanov (2012), and Atanassov (2013)). Butler et al. (2005) 
show that stock liquidity is an important determinant of costs of raising external capital. 
Ahuja and Katila (2001), Phillips and Zhdanov (2011), and Atanassov (2013) document 
the important role of merger and acquisition activities in enhancing innovation. 
Moreover, Xu and Zhao (2009) find that aggregate liquidity will lead to high merger and 
acquisition activity. I complement and extend this literature by examining the effects of 
stock market liquidity on firm innovation.  
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes sample selection, 
variable measurement, the control variables used in empirical analysis, and descriptive 
statistics. Section 1.3 presents the results from the effects of stock market liquidity on 
aggregate innovation. The effects of stock market liquidity on raising external capital and 
aggregate innovation are shown in section 1.4 and these effects on merger and acquisition 
11 
 
activities with innovation are presented in section 1.5. Section 1.6 investigates the effects 
of aggregate liquidity on innovation at firm level and section 1.7 concludes. 
1.2 Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, and Descriptive Statistics 
1.2.1 Sample Selection 
Two popular patent databases are currently publicly available, the NBER patent database 
and the patent database published by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman. Between 
them, the NBER patent database provides more detailed information on patent assignee 
names, the number of patents, the technological categories, the number of citations, the 
patent’s application year and the patent’s grant date, etc., from 1976 to 2006. It is 
valuable data used to examine firm innovation. However, in terms of aggregate patent 
applications, this database provides low frequency (on a yearly basis). Thus, to enrich my 
analysis, I prefer the patent database published by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and 
Stoffman because it contains patent’s application date from 1926 to 2010.  
I collect daily stock returns, prices, volumes, and number of shares outstanding from 
Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure and the zero daily returns (ZEROS) which is developed by Lesmond et al. 
(1999). I include all ordinary common stocks (share code 10 and 11) traded on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1975 to 2006. Primes, closed-end funds, real estate 
investment trusts (REIT), American Depository Receipts (ADR), and foreign companies 
are excluded in this study. At the aggregate level, my sample period is 31 years from 
1976 to 2006 with 372 months. 
12 
 
I collect the GDP growth rate, term structure and default spread from the Fed Reserve-St 
Louis. I define term structure as the difference between 10 year- Treasury bonds and 3 
month –Treasury bills and the default spread as the difference between yields of Moody’s 
BBB corporate bonds and of Moody’s AAA corporate bonds. Consistent with Nᴁs et al. 
(2011), the U.S. GDP growth rate and default spread are non-stationary in the period of 
time from 1975 to 2006. I transform them into stationary series by simply taking the 
difference. 
I also use COMPUSTAT files to calculate Tobin’s Q, total sales, market capitalization, 
research and development (R&D) ratio, leverage ratio, return on assets, capital 
expenditure ratio, tangibility, and cash ratio. I focus on the sample period of time from 




Besides financial firms, utility firms are also excluded from my sample. I also exclude 
firms with less than 200 trading days during the previous year (y-1) and with price at the 
end of fiscal year less than $5. I obtain 57,477 firm year observations during the period 
from 1975 to 2002. I then merge this data with patent data from NBER over the period 
1976 to 2002. I finally obtain 55,375 firm year observations. 
1.2.2 Innovation Measures 
In this paper, I examine the effects of stock market liquidity on innovation at both the 
aggregate and firm levels. Based on the existing literature on innovation (e.g. Hall et al. 
(2001 and 2005)), I use both R&D expenditures and patenting activity to measure 
                                                          
9
 The NBER patent database and patent truncation problems are discussed in detail in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001 and 2005). 
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innovation. While R&D expenditures are widely used to proxy for technological 
innovation, they do not measure the innovation output and efficiency. Thus, following 
recent studies (e.g. Atanassov et al. (2007), Hsu (2011), and Fang et al. (2013)) I 
emphasize more on patenting activity to measure innovation.  
Although patenting activity is usually used to capture innovation output, it contains two 
types of truncation problems. The first rises as the patents appear in the data only after 
they are granted. Thus, there is a significant lag between patent applications and patent 
grants (lately averaging about two years). As a result, only a small fraction of patent 
applications is shown during the last few years in the sample period. To deal with this 
problem, following the suggestion by Hall et al. (2005, and 2009), I exclude patent 
observations in the last four years of the data to make sure that almost all patent 
applications are filed in the data. 
The second problem is that patent citation tends to increase over time because the new 
patent can cite an older version. This truncation bias is more obviously acute for recent 
patents since I observe only the first few years of citations. Moreover, patents applied for 
different years suffer different economic condition. Thus, it is not comparable and cannot 
be aggregated (Hall et al. 2005). I deal with this problem by following Hall et al. (2005) 
to adjust the citations for each patent until 2006 of the NBER patent database and I only 
use patent citations to measure innovation at firm level. 
To measure aggregate innovation, I accumulate all patent applications for publicly traded 
firms in the U.S. from the patent database published by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and 
Stoffman for each month from 1976 to 2006 and take this variable in logs. Over this 
sample period of 31 years (372 months) the changes in economic conditions and firm 
14 
 
structures potentially generate non-stationarity in this aggregate innovation series. Thus, 
to avoid the risk of obtaining spurious results, I employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test with the null hypothesis that this variable has a unit root. The result shows 
that the null hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significant level. Therefore, I fol9low Hsu 
(2011) to detrend this time series by taking the difference between the value of aggregate 
patents (in logs) at month t and the average of all value of aggregate patents previous 
twelve months (one year)
10
 as follow: 
                   
 
  
∑          
  
     (1) 
where apt is the number of total patent applications of firms shown in CRSP in month t.  
I also use the aggregate R&D expenditures to proxy for aggregate innovation. However, 
because patenting activity is considered a better measure to proxy for innovation, I only 
use aggregate R&D expenditures to capture innovation when I examine the relation 
between it and aggregate liquidity for groups of firms with different sizes. I simply 
detrend this variable by taking the difference of the log of its values.  
At firm level, I employ the log of number of patents scaled by size, the number of 
patents, the adjusted number of patent citations per patent scaled by size, as well as the 
adjusted number of patent citations per patent, and the ratio of R&D expenditures to total 
assets to capture firm innovation. These variables are widely used in current literature 
(e.g. Hall et al. (2005), and Atanassov et al. (2007)). 
                                                          
10
 My results are consistent when I use a detrending method at different time intervals such as taking the 
difference between the value of aggregate number of patent applications this month and the average of all 
number of patent applications over the previous 6 months or18 months.  
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1.2.3 Liquidity Measures 
Although there are numerous studies on liquidity, the liquidity concept itself is still 
unclear and ambiguous (Cholette et al. (2007)) because it comprises of several 
dimensions including trading costs, turnover, bid-ask spreads, and price impact. To 
capture this idea, current finance literature generally considers liquidity as the ability to 
trade large quantities quickly at low cost with little price impact (Liu (2006) and Chordia 
et al. (2009)). Although this definition of multi-dimensional liquidity is generally 
accepted, a single liquidity measure may not capture all dimensions of liquidity (Cholette 
et al., (2007)).  
Because this essay examines the effects of stock market liquidity on innovation and 
investigates whether an increase in stock market liquidity can reduce the cost of raising 
equity, I prefer a liquidity measure which is priced. I mainly use Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure since it has some advantages. First, it can be computed using daily 
data and thus allows me to study a much longer period of time. Second, it corresponds to 
the concept of price impact and is priced. Third, it is highly correlated with other liquidity 
measures such as bid-ask spread, trading volume, and other price impact measures (e.g. 
Geyenko et al. (2009)). Fourth, it is also highly correlated with a common systematic 
component of liquidity and is widely used to measure liquidity at both aggregate and firm 
levels (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen (2006), Kamara et al (2008), and Geyenko et al. 
(2009)).  
Amihud (2012) illiquidity measure (ILLIQi,y) is calculated as follow: 
         
 
   
∑
      
           
   
      (2) 
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where Di,y is the number of valid observation days for stock i in during year y, |    | is the 
absolute return on day t for security i. Pi,t, and VOLi,t are respectively the daily price, and 
trading volume of stock i on day t. Because the value of ILLIQ calculating from (2) is 
very tiny, it is standard to multiply the above estimate by 10
6
 for practical purposes. This 
measure is called an illiquidity measure because a high value indicates low liquidity. 
Another liquidity measure used in my essay is zero daily returns (ZEROS) which is 
developed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). It is also widely used in current 
literature (e.g. Bekaert et al. (2007), and Goyenko et al. (2009)). It is computed as the 
proportion of number of days with zero returns to the number of trading days in a year.  
I follow Amihud (2002) and exclude the firms with less than 200 trading days during the 
year y and with stock prices less than $5 at the end of year y. I also require firms to have 
trading volume and market capitalization in year y to calculate the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure. 
Because the impact of a firm on the stock markets depends on its size, I compute 
aggregate liquidity measures by using the value-weighted average method
11
. Due to the 
nonstationary nature of the time series of both the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure and zero daily returns, I follow Kamara et al. (2008) and Nᴁs et al. (2011) to 
detrend these time series by using the change in these liquidity measures (in logs) as my 
illiquidity measures. Specifically, I define these illiquidity measures as follow: 
AgILLIQt = log(AMILLIQt/ AMILLIQt-1), and  
AgZEROt =log(AZEROt/ AZEROt-1)    (3) 
                                                          
11




where AMILLIQt is the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure at time t and 
AZEROt is the aggregate zero daily returns.  
Table 1: Correlations between Aggregate Variables 
  NAgINNO AgINNO AgILLIQ AgZERO dGDP Term 
AgINNO 0.551      
 (0.00)      
AgILLIQ -0.090 0.005     
 (0.08) (0.93)     
AgZERO -0.089 0.007 0.228    
 (0.08) (0.89) (0.00)    
dGDP 0.114 -0.035 -0.026 -0.071   
 (0.03) (0.50) (0.61) (0.17)   
Term -0.017 0.018 0.077 0.187 0.070  
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.14) (0.00) (0.18)  
Cdefault 0.024 0.133 0.065 0.011 -0.154 -0.134 
  (0.64) (0.01) (0.21) (0.83) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
Notes: This table shows the Pearson correlation between the variables used in the analysis in my paper. The 
associated p-values are reported in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. (N)AgINNO is the 
detrended aggregate number of patents (next year). AgILLIQ is the detrended aggregate Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure, and AgZERO the detrended aggregate number of zero daily returns. The cross-
sectional illiquidity measures (AgILLIQ and AgZERO) are calculated as a weighted average across stocks 
and then are detrended. dGDP is the change in GDP growth rate, Term is term structure and Cdefault is the 
change in default spread. 
 
Table 1 presents the correlations between the detrended aggregate variables used in my 
analysis. This table shows that the two illiquidity measures are significantly correlated 
with each other and that they are also negatively correlated with the aggregate innovation 
captured by the number of patents next year. Table 1 shows that the GDP growth rate is 
positively related with the aggregate innovation next year but insignificantly correlated 
with the current innovation level. Moreover, term structure and default spread are not 
correlated with aggregate innovation next year. These results show that there is a lag in 
innovation activities and that stock markets play an important role in generating 
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innovation, consistent with the current studies (Hall et al. (2009), and Brown at el. 
(2009)). 
1.2.4 Control Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
To examine the effects of aggregate liquidity on innovation at firm level, I follow the 
current literature on innovation and liquidity to control for a set of firm and industry 
characteristics that may affect a firm’s future innovation. Specifically, my control 
variables include Tobin’s Q, size, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditure 
ratio, tangibility, firm age, cash ratio, R&D expenditure to total assets, and firm stock 
liquidity. I calculate the Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market value of equity plus book value 
of total assets minus book value of equity minus deferred taxes to book value of total 
assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total market value of equity, capital expenditure 
ratio is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales, tangibility is the ratio of net property, 
plant and equipment (PPE) to total assets and firm age is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the firm age in COMPUSTAT. Total debt ratio is the ratio of both short term and long 
term debt to total book value of total assets, while cash is cash and short term investments 
scaled by total assets. Return-on-assets ratio is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation divided by book value of total assets. I use both the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure and zero daily returns to capture firm stock liquidity. In my analysis, 
all firm characteristics are computed for each firm over its fiscal year y. I also use the 
Herfindahl index (HHI) based on annual sales to proxy for industry product market 
competition and the KZ index to capture firm’s financial constraints. These variables are 




Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
lpatent The natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patent 
application in year t 
lpatents The natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patent 
application scaled by firm size in year t 
lpcite The natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s adjusted number of patent 
citations per patent. The adjustment methods are shown in Hall et al. 
(2005). 
lpcites The natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s adjusted number of patent 
citations per patent scaled by size in year t 
RDAT R&D expenditure (#46) scaled by the book value of total assets (#6) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t, set to 0 if missing  
Q  Tobin’s Q, calculated as [market value of equity (#199×#25) plus book 
value of assets (#6) minus book value of equity (#60) minus balance 
sheet deferred taxes (#74, set to 0 if missing)] divided by book value of 
assets (#6)  
LSIZE Natural logarithm of firm i's total market value of equity (#25×#199) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t 
totaldebt Firm i’s total debt ratio, measured as book value of total debt (#9+#34) 
divided by book value of total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal 
year t 
ROA Return-on-assets ratio computed as operating income before 
depreciation (#13) divided by book value of total assets (#6), measured 
at the end of fiscal year t 
CAPX Capital expenditure (#128) scaled by sales (#12) measured at the end of 
fiscal year t 
TANG Net property, Plant & Equip ( #8) divided by book value of total assets 
(#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t  
CASH Cash and short term investments (#1) scaled by book value of total 
assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t 
LAGE Natural logarithm of one plus firm i's age, approximated by the number 
of years listed on Compustat 
ISSEQUITY Equity issuance of firm i in year t+1, calculated by the difference 
between Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (#108) and Purchase of 




Table 2: Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Definition 
ISSDEBT Debt issuance of firm i in year t+1, computed as long term debt 
issuance (#111) minus long term debt reduction (#114), plus changes in 
current debt (#301) scaled by total assets (#6) in previous year 
HHI Herfindahl index of 4-digit SIC industry j where firm i belongs, 
measured at the end of each year t 
KZINDEX The KZ-index of firm i measured at the end of fiscal year t, computed 
as -1.002 * Cash flow ((#18+#14)/#8) + 0.283 * Q plus 3.139x leverage 
((#9 + #34)/(#9+ #34 +#216)) - 39.368 * Dividends ((#24 +#19)/38) 
minus 1.315 * Cash holding (#1/#8, where #8 is lagged). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for variables used to analyze the effects of aggregate 
liquidity on firm innovation. The sample period is from 1976 to 2002. lpatent and lpcite are respectively the 
logarithm of one plus the number of patents and of one plus the number of citations per patent for each 
firm. ILLIQ and ZERO are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures. Q, LSIZE, 
totaldebt, ROA, CAPX, TANG, RDAT, and CASH are respectively Tobin’s Q, logarithm of market 
capitalization, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditure ratio, tangible assets ratio, R&D 
expenditures to total assets, and cash holding ratio. HHI is the Herfindahl index, and LAGE is logarithm of 
one plus firm age. 
Variable 5% 25% Median Mean 75% 95% N 
lpatent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.603 0.693 3.178      55,375  
lpcite 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.657 1.429 2.998      55,375  
ILLIQ 0.001 0.013 0.089 0.640 0.493 3.070      55,375  
ZERO 0.028 0.099 0.167 0.178 0.244 0.352      55,375  
Q 0.799 1.036 1.358 1.930 2.041 4.826      55,375  
LSIZE 2.939 4.171 5.242 5.441 6.540 8.576      55,375  
totaldebt 0.000 0.067 0.206 0.220 0.333 0.539      55,375  
ROA -0.066 0.093 0.145 0.133 0.199 0.298      55,375  
CAPX 0.008 0.026 0.048 0.286 0.095 0.391      55,375  
TANG 0.049 0.157 0.276 0.322 0.445 0.762      55,375  
RDAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.037 0.162      55,375  
CASH 0.004 0.022 0.065 0.139 0.183 0.541      55,375  
HHI 0.056 0.115 0.191 0.239 0.307 0.621      55,375  
LAGE 1.609 2.079 2.773 2.721 3.332 3.738      55,375  
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Table 3 provides summary statistics of firm variables used in my analysis. On average, a 
firm in my sample acquires 0.83 patents per year and each patent was cited 2.53 times. 
The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure has a mean value of 0.640 and the mean value of 
zero daily returns is 0.178. The average market capitalization of firms in my sample is 
$1.63 billion and each firm invests 3.48% total assets in R&D on average. This table also 
shows that an average firm has ROA of 13.32%, total debt ratio of 20.03%, PPE ratio of 
32.22%, cash ratio of 13.90%, and is 14.20 years old. 
1.3 Stock Market Liquidity and Aggregate Innovation 
1.3.1 In- sample Evidence 
An important issue in investigating innovation is the time lag between input and output of 
this process. Stoneman (1983) argued strongly that patents are an input to the R&D 
process rather than its output. That is because firms tend to file their patent at the 
beginning of an innovation process. Consistent with this argument, Hall, Griliches and 
Hausman (1986) find that R&D investments contemporaneously affect patenting activity 
but the “contribution of R&D history to the current year’s patent applications is quite 
small”. Recently, Gurmu and Perez-Sebastian (2007) document that “the 
contemporaneous relationship between patenting and R&D expenditures continues to be 
strong, accounting for over 60% of total R&D elasticity.”  Further, Gurmu and Perez-
Sebastian (2007) show that the time-lag between R&D and patenting becomes shorter 
over time. Thus, it is reasonable to examine the effects of stock market liquidity on 
aggregate innovation next year. I will also robustly extend the time gap in the next 
section.   
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As shown in the previous section, future aggregate innovation is positively correlated 
with the current stock market liquidity level. In this section, I examine the ability of 




   AgINNOt+12 =  α + βAILLIQt +γXt + εt+12   (4) 
Where AgINNOt+12 is the aggregate innovation growth rate captured by the aggregate 
number of patent applications in month t+12 (one year later), AILLIQt is aggregate stock 
market liquidity measures captured by aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero 
daily returns measure by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) at month t. Xt is a vector 
of control variables (change in GDP growth rate (dGDP), term and change in default 
spread (cdefault), and the current aggregate innovation growth rate (AgINNOt) at month 
t.  
Table 4 reports the results from the various regression specifications from the above 
model. The first specification includes only one of the liquidity measures and the lag of 
aggregate innovation. Both panel A and B of this table show that both liquidity measures 
are significantly correlated with future aggregate innovation captured by aggregate 
number of patent applications. The coefficient of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is -
0.184 and its t-statistic is 2.99, while the coefficient of zero daily returns is -0.474 and its 
t-statistic is 2.54. This implies that an increase in stock market liquidity predicts a higher 
aggregate innovation growth rate.  
                                                          
12
 My results are consistent when I control for aggregate capital inflows and outflows, unemployment rate 
and fed funds. 
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It is useful to interpret these coefficients to comprehend the magnitude of the estimated 
effects. My sample shows that the standard deviation of change in Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity (AgILLIQ) is 0.072 and of change in aggregate zero daily returns (AgZERO) 
is 0.028. Thus, for one standard deviation increase in AgILLIQ or in AgZERO, the 
aggregate innovation growth rate will decrease by 1.32%. During the sample period, the 
average aggregate innovation growth rate is 1.30%. Thus, this predicted change in 
aggregate innovation growth rate is more than the average growth rate in aggregate 
innovation.  
 
Table 4: Stock Market Illiquidity and Aggregate Innovation 
 












Intercept 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.008 
  (0.21) (0.18) (0.77) (0.84) 
AgILLIQt -0.184*** -0.178*** -0.173*** -0.169*** 
  (-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.82) (-2.80) 
AgINNOt 0.566***  0.571***  0.571*** 0.575*** 
  (6.43)  6.53  6.50 (6.45) 
 dGDPt   1.990*** 2.024*** 1.962*** 
    2.92 (2.95) (2.98) 
 Termt    -0.003  -0.004 
     (-0.76)  (-0.84) 
Cdefaultt      -0.037 
       (-0.78) 
N 372 372 372 372 





Table 4: Stock Market Illiquidity and Aggregate Innovation (continued) 












Intercept 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.49) (0.57) 
AgZEROt -0.474** -0.428** -0.406** -0.402** 
 
(-2.54) (-2.30) (-2.08) (-2.07) 
AgINNOt 0.566*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.576*** 
 
(6.48) (6.57) (6.54) (6.50) 
dGDPt  
1.935*** 1.963*** 1.892*** 
  
(2.80) (2.81) (2.83) 
Termt   
-0.002 -0.003 
   
(-0.52) (-0.62) 
Cdefaultt    
-0.042 
    
(-0.89) 
N 372 372 372 372 
R-square 0.3090 0.3235 0.3221 0.3214 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation on aggregate 
liquidity measure and other macro variables last 12 months for the period 1976 to 2006. AgINNOt+12 is 
aggregate innovation captured by the number of patent applications next year (12 months). AgILIQ t and 
AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures at month 
t. dGDPt, Termt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the 
change in default spread. Panel A shows the effects of aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity on aggregate 
patent, and Panel B shows the effects of zero daily return measure on aggregate patent. The Newey-West 
corrected t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, and ** denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Other macroeconomic variables may contain information about future aggregate 
innovation. I therefore consider the effects of aggregate liquidity on future innovation 
after controlling for some main macroeconomic variables. I choose some main variables 
which are widely used in the current literature: GDP growth rate, term structure and 
default spread. While GDP growth rate can capture the general macroeconomic 
condition, term structure and default spread can capture the debt market condition. I then 
run the regression specifications in which I control for these variables.  
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The results in table 4 show that aggregate liquidity measures (AgILLIQ and AgZERO) 
are still significantly correlated with future aggregate innovation growth rate. Moreover, 
GDP growth rate is an important factor in predicting future innovation while term 
structure and default spread are not significantly correlated with the aggregate innovation 
growth rate in the future. My results indicate that general macroeconomic conditions and 
the stock market play important roles in enhancing firms to innovate in future. These 
results are consistent with recent studies (e.g. Atanassov et al. (2007), Hall et al. (2009), 
and Brown et al. (2009)). Atanassov at al. (2007) find that public firms prefer equity and 
public debt to bank debt to finance their innovation. Brown et al. (2009) document that 
the U.S. firms finance their R&D from two main sources: cash flow and stock issues.  
Overall, my study shows that stock market liquidity contains economically significant 
information about future aggregate innovation. When the stock market liquidity 
improves, the aggregate innovation will be enhanced, and vice versa.  
1.3.2 Robustness Tests 
In the previous section, I allow a one year gap between aggregate stock market liquidity 
and aggregate information. Although both Hall et al. (1986) and Gurmu and Perez-
Sebastian (2007) document the significant impact of contemporaneous R&D investments 
on patenting, they differently show the effects of lag R&D on patent application. While 
Hall et al. (1986) show that these effects are very small, Gurmu and Perez-Sebastian 
(2007) note that lag R&D elasticity of patents may account for 40% of total R&D 
elasticity of patents. Thus, in this section, I will extend the time gap between aggregate 
stock market liquidity and aggregate innovation to 18 months or 2 years. I first re-detrend 
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the aggregate number of patent application to reflect the time gap and then conduct the 
test using model (4). The results are shown in table 5.  
Table 5 shows that both aggregate illiquidity measures are significantly correlated with 
aggregate innovation next eighteen months, even after controlling for some macro 
variables. The coefficient of aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity proxy is -0.150 with its 
t-statistic value of -2.46. Similarly, the t-statistic of the coefficient of aggregate zero daily 
returns is -2.19, which is significant at 5% significance level. This result still holds when 
I extend the time gap between aggregate stock market liquidity and aggregate innovation 
to 2 years (not reported). 
I also robustly test the effect of aggregate stock market liquidity on aggregate innovation 
by using a vector auto-regression (VAR)  methodology. The benefit of this method is to 
control for other endogenous variables which may affect both aggregate stock market 
liquidity and aggregate innovation. In particular, I use the following model: 
Yt = c + Ψt-1Yt-1 + Ψt-2Yt-2 + …+ Ψt-pYt-p + εt (5) 
Where Y = (AgINNO, AILLIQ, dGDP, Term, Cdefault) denotes a (4×1) vector of time 
series variables, Ψi are (4×4) coefficient matrices and εt is a (4×1) vector of noise errors. 
I run model (5) with p from 12 to 24 (months). The results (not reported) show that both 
the aggregate stock market liquidity measures are significantly correlated with aggregate 
innovation. These results support my hypothesis that stock market liquidity enhances 
















Intercept 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.003 
  (0.21) (0.66) (0.05) (0.32) 
AgILLIQt -0.184*** -0.150**   
  (-2.99) (-2.46)   
AgZEROt   -0.474** -0.432** 
   (-2.54) (-2.19) 
AgINNOt 0.566*** 0.571*** 0.566*** 0.571*** 
  (6.43) (6.60) (6.48) (6.66) 
 dGDPt  1.989***  2.050*** 
   (3.16)  (3.25) 
 Termt  -0.003  -0.002 
   (-0.63)  (-0.36) 
Cdefaultt  0.003  0.001 
   (0.11)  (0.05) 
N 372 372 372 372 
Adj R-square 0.3090 0.3254 0.3090 0.3268 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation on aggregate 
liquidity measure and other macro variables last 18 months for the period 1976 to 2006. AgINNOt+18 is 
aggregate innovation captured by the number of patent applications next 18 months. AgILIQt and 
AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures at month 
t. dGDPt, Termt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the 
change in default spread. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, and 




1.3.3.1 Granger Causality Tests 
Current literature debates the relation between firm stock liquidity and firm innovation. 
However, the results are mixed. On the one hand, Fang et al. (2013) find that firm stock 
liquidity will impede its innovation. On the other hand, Dass et al. (2012) document that 
innovative firms have higher liquidity and that they take a variety of actions to keep their 
stocks liquid. Nevertheless, there is no study examining this relation at aggregate level. 
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To my best knowledge, I am the first to investigate the relation between aggregate 
liquidity and innovation at both the aggregate and firm levels. I am primarily interested in 
the predictive power of aggregate liquidity for aggregate innovation, but there is also the 
possibility of causality going in the opposite direction, with the change in aggregate 
innovation growth rate affecting stock market liquidity. I examine this issue directly by 
performing Granger causality tests. As analyzed in the previous section, some 
macroeconomic variables can affect both aggregate innovation and aggregate liquidity, I 
control for these variables in running Granger causality tests. 
An important note about Granger causality test is that the results depend on the lag 
length. Thus, I require that the lag is long enough to reflect the effects of past values of 
these time series on their current values. I also use the log likelihood and AICC criteria to 
choose the right lag length. I then perform the tests using a VAR framework. These tests 
are conducted for the whole sample and for subsamples.  
Table 6 shows the results from these tests. In the first part of Panel A and B, the null 
hypothesis is that aggregate liquidity measures (AgILLIQ and AgZERO) do not Granger 
cause aggregate innovation growth rate (AgILLIQ  dAgINNO and AgZERO  
dAgINNO). This null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level for aggregate Amihud (2002) 
liquidity measure and for aggregate zero daily returns (AgZERO) in subsamples. For the 
whole sample period, this hypothesis is rejected at 5% level for aggregate zero daily 
returns (AgZERO). These results imply that stock market liquidity does Granger cause 




Table 6: Granger Causality Tests 
 
Panel A: ILLIQ 
 
  Whole sample First Haft Second Haft 
  1975-2005 1975-1990 1991-2005 
H0: dAgILLIQ  dAgINNO     
χ
2 
144.46*** 160.16*** 132.71*** 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H0: dAgINNO  dAgILLIQ     
χ
2
 87.72 138.97*** 71.11 
P-value 0.71 0.00 0.97 
N 372 192 180 
 
 
Panel B: ZERO 
 
  Whole sample First Haft Second Haft 
  1975-2005 1975-1990 1991-2005 
H0: dAgZERO  dAgINNO 
  χ
2
 126.10** 177.63*** 132.11*** 
P-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 
H0: dAgINNO  dAgZERO 
  χ
2
 122.18** 157.17*** 103.26 
P-value 0.04 0.00 0.29 
N 372 192 180 
 
Notes: This table shows Granger causality tests between aggregate innovation (detrended) and (a) the 
detrended aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and (b) zero daily return measure. The test is 
performed for the whole sample period and different sub-periods. For each illiquidity measure, I first test 
the null hypothesis that illiquidity does not Granger cause the aggregate innovation. I report χ
2 
and P-value 
for each test. I choose the optimal lag length based on the log likelihood and AICC criteria. ***, and ** 
denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
An interesting point in these results is that aggregate innovation growth rate does not 
Granger cause aggregate liquidity for the whole sample and for the period of time from 
1990 to 2006. However, it Granger causes aggregate liquidity for the period of time from 
1975 to 1990. This may be a result of the relatively weak power of institutional investors 
and/or the high volume of M&A activities at that time. 
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1.3.3.2 Aggregate Liquidity, Aggregate Innovation and Technological Categories 
In the previous section, I conducted the Granger causality tests to examine the causality 
problem between aggregate stock market liquidity and aggregate innovation. Because 
endogeneity is a serious problem in empirical finance (Roberts and Whited (2012)), I 
consider some other methods to deal with it. Since the technological development such as 
in computers and internet industries can make the stock markets more liquid, I exclude 
firms in these industries to test the effects of stock market liquidity on aggregate 
innovation. 
I follow Fama and French (1997) to define computer and internet related industries as the 
industries with the following four-digit SIC codes 3660 to 3692, 3695 to 3699, 3810 to 
3839, 4800 to 4899, 7370 to 7373 and 7375. I first accumulate all patent applications for 
firms in the remaining industries, then I regress this aggregate innovation on aggregate 
liquidity and other macro variables.  
The results in table 7 present that aggregate stock market liquidity is significantly related 
to aggregate innovation. This result is consistent when firms in high tech industries are 
excluded
13
. The coefficient of aggregate Amihud (2002) proxy in the first model is -2.06 
with its t-statistic of 3.20. Similarly, the coefficient of aggregate zero daily returns is -
0.563 with its t-statistic of -2.78. The absolute values of these figures are greater than 
those in table 4, implying that the effect of aggregate stock market liquidity on aggregate 
innovation is more pronounced for firms in non- computer and internet related industries.  
 
                                                          
13
 High tech industries are those with the following four-digit SIC codes from 3570 to 3579, 3600 to 3629, 
3640 to 3646, 3648 to 3649, 3660 to 3692, 3695 to 3699, 4800 to 4899, 7370 to 7373 and 7375. 
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Table 7: Aggregate Illiquidity and Aggregate Innovation of Firms in Non-computer and 











Intercept 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.004 
  (0.17) (0.77) (-0.02) (0.37) 
AgILLIQt -0.206*** -0.170*** 
    (-3.20) (-2.67) 
  AgZEROt   -0.563*** -0.516** 
   (-2.78) (-2.41) 
AgINNOt 0.513*** 0.518*** 0.515*** 0.520*** 
  (5.83) (5.98) (5.90) (6.06) 
 dGDPt  1.981***  2.047*** 
   (2.99)  (3.09) 
 Termt  -0.004  -0.002 
   (-0.78)  (-0.47) 
Cdefaultt  0.003  0.001 
   (0.11) 
 
(0.05) 
N 372 372 372 372 
Adj R-square 0.2589 0.2749 0.2604 0.2776 
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation of firms in non-
computer and internet related industries on aggregate liquidity measure and other macro variables last 12 
months for the period 1976 to 2006. AgINNOt+12 is aggregate innovation captured by the number of patent 
applications next year (12 months). AgILIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity and zero daily return measures at month t. dGDPt, Termt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the 
change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the change in default spread. The Newey-West corrected t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, and ** denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
1.3.3.3 Publicly Traded Firms versus Non-publicly Traded Firms and Other Sectors 
In this paper, I hypothesize that aggregate liquidity will enhance innovation because it 
can reduce the cost of equity issuance and encourage merger and acquisition activities. 
Since non-publicly traded firms and other institutions do not directly use stock markets to 
raise their capital, I expect that the effects of aggregate liquidity on their innovation are 
much weaker. I use both the aggregate number of patent application of non-publicly 




Similar to the previous sections, I accumulate all monthly patent applications for non-
publicly traded firms and other institutions in the U.S. from the patent database published 
by Kogan et al. (2012) from 1976 to 2006 and take this variable in logs. I also aggregate 
all yearly R&D expenditures for non-publicly traded firms from COMPUSTAT in the 
same period. I then use model (4) to regress these aggregate innovation variables on 
aggregate liquidity and other control macro-variables. The results are reported in table 8. 









Intercept 0.008 0.007 0.068 0.121 




   (-1.49) 
 
(-0.10) 
 AgZEROt  -0.176  0.274 
   (-1.03)  (1.49) 
      
AgINNOt 0.377*** 0.379*** 
    (4.19) (4.22) 
  AgRDt-1   0.049 0.035 
    (0.24) (0.18) 
dGDPt 1.961*** 1.931*** -3.888 -6.062 
  (2.76) (2.67) (-0.57) (-0.93) 
 Termt -0.002 -0.001 0.032 0.014 
  (-0.42) (-0.32) (0.79) (0.34) 
Cdefaultt -0.071 -0.073 0.113 0.071 
  (-1.43) (-1.48) (0.810 (0.52) 
N 372 372 31 31 
R -square 0.1687 0.1653 0.0537 0.1304 
 
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation of non-publicly 
traded firms on aggregate liquidity measure and other macro variables last 12 months for the period 1976 to 
2006. AgINNOt+12 is aggregate innovation captured by the number of patent applications next year (12 
months). AgRDt is aggregate R&D expenditures. AgILIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures at month t. dGDPt, Termt, Cdefaultt and are 
respectively the change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the change in default spread. The Newey-
West corrected t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, and ** denotes a rejection of the null 




Consistent with my prediction, this table shows that both aggregate liquidity measures do 
not significantly affect aggregate innovation. T-statistics of the coefficients of AgILLIQ 
and AgZERO are less than 1.50. The results from this table also show that while GDP 
growth rate is significantly correlated with aggregate innovation captured by aggregate 
number of patent application, it is not significantly related to aggregate R&D 
investments.  
1.3.3.4 Liquidity Shock and Innovation 
An important method to deal with the endogeneity problem in the relationship between 
liquidity and innovation is to examine the effect of an exogenous shock to stock liquidity 
on firm innovation. Using a difference–in–difference methodology, Fang et al. (2013) 
find that the decimalization of the minimum tick size in 2001 negatively affects firm 
innovation. However, the underlying assumption of this model is that the macroeconomic 
conditions equally affect both types of firms (firms are designated as either control or 
treatment). This assumption seems incorrect because the years around decimalization 
during 2000-2002 were the years in which the tech bubble bursts. During this period, 
innovative firms or firms in high tech industries could be more affected by the burst of 
the technology bubble. Furthermore, since the patent data is censored at zero, comparing 
the change in innovation among the firms may not be correct. Therefore, Dass et al. 
(2012) point out that the method used in Fang et al. (2013) contains some weaknesses and 
suggest that the lag innovation should be controlled when examining the effects of 
liquidity on innovation.  After controlling for lag innovation, they document a positive 
relation between liquidity and innovation.  
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I first re-examine the effects of an endogenous shock to liquidity around the 
decimalization year of 2001 on firm innovation. Before 2000, the minimum price 
variation for quotes and trades on three major U.S. exchanges was $1/16. Over the period 
of August 28, 2000 to January 29, 2001, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) reduced the minimum tick size to pennies. The 
NASDAQ adapted this policy over the interval of March 12, 2001 to April 09, 2001. 
Following Fang et al. (2013) and Dass et al. (2012), I consider the decimalization year of 
2001 as year of liquidity shock, and investigate the effects of the change in firm stock 
liquidity from 2000 to 2002 on the change in firm innovation from 2000 to 2002 or from 
2000 to 2003.  
Panel A of table 9 shows that the change in firm stock liquidity is positively related with 
the change in firm innovation. This means that after controlling for some firm 
characteristics, an improvement in stock liquidity will enhance firm innovation. The T-
statistics of the coefficients of change in stock illiquidity captured by Amahud (2002) and 
zero daily return ratio are from -3.25 to -1.83. This result shows that the shock to stock 
liquidity in 2001 enhanced firm innovation. 
The results in table 9 present that lag innovations are negatively correlated with the 
change in innovation for firms from 2000 to 2002. The T-statistics of the coefficients of 
lag patent application or lag patent citation are from -15.93 to -15.60. These results are 
consistent with Dass et al.’s (2012) suggestions. 
Panel A of table 9 also shows that larger firms or firms with higher R&D investments 
will have more patent application with higher citation. In contrast, firms with high capital 
expenditures will obtain less patent application as well as less citation per patent. 
35 
 
Interestingly, the results in table 9 present that firm’s total assets and leverage do not 
affect the change in firm innovation from 2000 to 2002.  
I extend this finding by examining the effects of another shock to stock liquidity on firm 
innovation: the effect of tick size reduction in 1997. On March 13, 1997 the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) adapted the new tick size of sixteenth for all stocks. Shortly 
later, the NASDAQ board approved quotes in 1/16 on March 25. On June 24, 1997 the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) declined the minimum tick size for quoting and 
trading stocks from an eighth to a sixteenth, ending the 205 year history of stock priced in 
eighths. As a consequence of this tick size reduction, liquidity was improved because 
both spreads and depths declined (Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)). 
I consider the year of 1997 as a year of liquidity shock and investigate the relationship 
between the change in stock liquidity from 1996 to 1998 and the change in firm 
innovation from the same period and from 1996 to 1999. The results in Panel B table 9 
reports that the t-statistics of the coefficients of change in stock illiquidity captured by 
Amahud (2002) are from -2.48 to -1.66, implying that the change in liquidity is 
significantly positively correlated with change in firm innovation during this period of 
time.  
Overall, the results in table 9 and 10 shows that the tick size reduction in 1997 and 2001 
positively affects firm innovation. These results are consistent with the Dass et al.’s 
(2012) findings but inconsistent with Fang et al.’s (2013) results. These results are also 




Table 9: Liquidity Shock and Firm Innovation 
Panel A: Liquidity Shock around the Decimalization Year of 2001 and Firm Innovation  
 
 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+1 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+1 ΔLpcitei,t-1,t+1 ΔLpcitei,t-1,t+1 
ΔILLIQi,t-1, t+1 -0.001**  -0.002***  
 (-2.12)  (-3.25)  
ΔZEROi,t-1,t+1  -0.211*  -0.438** 
  (-1.83)  (-2.50) 
Lpatenti,t-1 -0.237*** -0.237***   
 (-15.61) (-15.60)   
Lpcitei,t-1   -0.397*** -0.397*** 
   (-15.82) (-15.93) 
LSIZEi,t-1  0.054*** 0.053*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 
 (4.50) (4.45) (5.73) (5.74) 
ΔLSIZEi,t-1 0.022* 0.017 0.008 -0.003 
 (1.84) (1.26) (0.49) (-0.16) 
ΔLATi,t-1 0.043 0.037 0.020 0.012 
 (1.34) (1.18) (0.43) (0.25) 
Totaldebti,t-1 -0.068 -0.077 -0.138 -0.148 
 (-1.17) (-1.31) (-1.45) (-1.55) 
ΔTotaldebti,t-1 -0.099 -0.098 -0.193 -0.185 
 (-1.17) (-1.15) (-1.46) (-1.39) 
CAPXi,t-1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.13) (-6.89) (-6.51) 
ΔCAPXi,t-1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.11) (-6.83) (-6.47) 
TANGi,t-1 -0.048 -0.050 -0.233** -0.238** 
 (-0.78) (-0.82) (-2.15) (-2.23) 
ΔTANGi,t-1 0.417*** 0.415*** 0.273 0.270 
 (2.75) (2.77) (1.27) (1.29) 
RDATi,t-1 0.397* 0.411* 1.168* 1.194** 
 (1.65) (1.69) (1.95) (1.98) 
ΔRDATi,t-1 0.115 0.112 0.855** 0.851** 
 (0.47) (0.46) (2.41) (2.42) 
_cons -0.154*** -0.146*** -0.139* -0.119 
 (-4.10) (-3.78) (-1.66) (-1.45) 
N 3298 3305 3298 3305 
R-square 0.1308 0.1314 0.1719 0.1723 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model of change in firm innovation on change in 
stock liquidity and other control variables around the year of liquidity shock of 2001 and 1997. ΔLpatenti,t-
1,t+1 and Δlpcitei,t-1,t+1 are respectively the change in the logarithm of number of patents of firm i, and the 
adjusted number of patent citations per patent of firm i from year t-1 to year t+1. ΔILLIQi,t-1 and ΔZEROi,t-
1,t+1 are the change in Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures. LSIZE, totaldebt, CAPX, 
TANG, and RDAT are respectively logarithm of market capitalization, total debt ratio, capital expenditure 
ratio, tangible assets ratio, and R&D expenditures to total assets. ***, **, and * denotes a rejection of the 
null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel A reports the effects of the change in 
liquidity around the decimalization year of 2001 on firm innovation and panel B shows the effects of the 




Table 9: Liquidity Shock and Firm Innovation (continued) 
Panel B: Liquidity Shock around the Tick Size Reduction Year of 1997 and Firm Innovation 
 
 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+1 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+1 ΔLpcitei,t-1,t+1 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+2 ΔLpatenti,t-1, t+2 ΔLpcitei,t-1,t+2 
ΔILLIQi,t-1, t+1 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 (-2.34) (-1.81) (-1.86) (-2.01) (-1.66) (-2.48) 
Lpatenti,t-1 -0.231*** -0.285***  -0.303***   
 (-11.37) (-17.98)  (-11.38)   
Lpcitei,t-1   -0.497***  -0.497*** -0.430*** 
   (-23.94)  (-21.80) (-19.85) 
LSIZEi,t-1  0.059*** 0.110***  0.096***  
  (5.27) (5.55)  (6.14)  
ΔLSIZEi,t-1 -0.029** 0.014* 0.058* -0.026** 0.018 -0.067** 
 (-2.52) (1.76) (1.99) (-2.54) (0.90) (-2.43) 
ΔLATi,t-1 0.086*** 0.104*** 0.054 0.123*** 0.145*** 0.135*** 
 (2.78) (3.55) (1.41) (3.75) (3.30) (2.69) 
Totaldebti,t-1  0.048 -0.108  -0.020  
  (0.76) (-1.03)  (-0.18)  
ΔTotaldebti,t-1 -0.196*** -0.176** -0.163 -0.262*** -0.372* -0.392** 
 (-2.80) (-2.34) (-1.67) (-3.24) (-1.70) (-2.20) 
CAPXi,t-1  0.007 0.013  0.021  
  (0.90) (0.89)  (1.29)  
ΔCAPXi,t-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (20.17) (17.72) (40.22) (3.62) (18.49) (48.14) 
TANGi,t-1  0.008 0.023  0.027  
  (0.13) (0.31)  (0.23)  
ΔTANGi,t-1 0.326** 0.284* 0.090 0.318** 0.219* 0.282** 
 (2.21) (1.96) (0.46) (2.42) (1.80) (2.35) 
RDATi,t-1  0.172** 1.053***  0.868***  
  (2.23) (4.27)  (3.56)  
ΔRDATi,t-1 0.097 0.240* 0.976** 0.310** 1.345*** 0.881*** 
 (0.66) (1.70) (2.17) (2.22) (5.07) (4.35) 
_cons 0.089*** -0.184*** -0.263** 0.101*** -0.215** 0.241*** 
 (7.31) (-2.93) (-2.39) (6.01) (-2.27) (15.15) 
N 3584 3584 3584 3584 3584 3584 
R-square 0.1503 0.1755 0.2269 0.2200 0.2376 0.2078 
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1.3.3.5 Out–of –sample 
Literature has documented several factors affecting firm’s innovation activity, including 
capital, labor skill, market competition, macroeconomic condition, and legal system, etc. 
These variables have changed over time, causing a change in firm’s innovation 
productivity.  
In the previous section, I document that aggregate stock liquidity has predictive power for 
both the whole and subsample period. In this section, I examine the effects of aggregate 
liquidity on aggregate innovation out of sample. If the predictive power of aggregate 
liquidity is persistent, I expect it will hold in this period.  
I choose the period of time from 1955 to 1975 when all relevant macroeconomic 
variables are available. More importantly, there are no official R&D expenditures before 
1953. Before discussing the effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate innovation, I 
briefly review the aggregate patent applications and macroeconomic conditions during 
this period. More details can be found in Griliches’ (1980, 1989, and 1998). 
This period witnessed two slowdowns in the growth of labor productivity: 1965-1973 and 
1973-1978 (Griliches (1980)). The total number of patent applications increased 
significantly from 1955 to 1966, fluctuated and peaked in 1970, then declined until the 
mid of 1980s. Total R&D expenditures also significantly grew up before 1968 and then 
decreased until 1975. Although the decrease in patenting activity in late 1960s and 1970s 
may have been driven by the decline in R&D, it also was associated with some economic 
factors. First, there was a shift in patenting activity and R&D expenditures among 
industries. Some traditionally high-patenting industries such as chemicals, rubber or 
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fabricated metals reduced both R&D expenditures and patent applications, while 
computer and electrical equipment industries experienced high R&D expenditures but 
achieved less patent applications during this period. Second, the global economy went 
into a difficult stage. Third, spending from federal government on R&D was low. Finally, 
the patent grant process was slow; it took on average more than 2 years for a patent to be 
granted. 
Due to the economic condition, the lag time between R&D investments and patenting 
should be longer during this period. I lengthen the lag between aggregate liquidity and 
innovation from 1 to 2.5 years. Using model (4) in the previous section, I investigate the 
effects of aggregate liquidity on future aggregate innovation growth rate. Because most 
stocks named in CRSP were traded in NYSE during this period, I consider both equally 
weighted and value weighted aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity and aggregate zero daily 
return measures. The results are reported in table 10. 
As discussed above, the slowdowns in patenting productivity may result in an increase in 
the lag between input and output of innovation. Consistent with this hypothesis, table 10 
shows that aggregate liquidity is not correlated with aggregate innovation growth rate 
next year. However, it is significantly correlated with this rate in the next 2 years. The 
absolute values of t-statistics of coefficients of aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity 
measures are greater than 3.4. T-statistic of coefficient of equally weighted aggregate 
zero daily return measure with is -1.94. The results are consistent when I choose the lag 
of 1.5 years or 2.5 years (not reported).  
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  (2) 
AgINNOt+24 
  (3) 
AgINNOt+24 










Intercept 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.021* 0.019 0.021* 0.022* 
 (0.97) (0.81) (0.58) (0.33) (1.68) (1.61) (1.74) (1.80) 
AgILLIQ1t -0.634*** 
   
-0.014 
    (-3.49) 
   
(-0.09) 
   AgILLIQ2t  -0.400***  0.092 
  (-3.43)    (0.83)   
AgZERO1t   0.210 
 
  0.217  
   (0.42) 
 
  (0.56)  
AgZERO2t     -1.104**    0.555 
     (-1.94)    (1.18) 
AgINNOt 0.402*** 0.408*** 0.397*** 0.393*** 0.498*** 0.495*** 0.500*** 0.497*** 
 (6.64) (6.67) (6.10) (6.23) (8.35) (8.26) (8.41) (8.34) 
dGDPt -0.740 -0.646 -0.990** -0.947* -0.738 -0.807 -0.724 -0.782 
 (-1.48) (-1.26) (-1.98) (-1.84) (-1.34) (-1.42) (-1.34) (-1.41) 
Termt -0.002 0.003 0.008 0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(-0.17) (0.30) (0.73) (0.97) (-1.17) (-1.040 (-1.25) (-1.29) 
Cdefaultt -0.027 -0.054 -0.103 -0.083 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 
 (-0.23) (-0.46) (-0.83) (-0.69) (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.17) 
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R-square 0.2169 0.2120 0.1673 0.1814 0.2532 0.2558 0.2538 0.257 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation on aggregate liquidity measure and other macro variables last 
12 or 24 months for the period 1955 to 1975. AgINNO t+12 (24) is aggregate innovation captured by the number of patent applications next year (next two 
years). AgILLIQ1t and AgILLIQ2t are respectively the aggregate value weighted and equally weighted Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  AgZERO1 t 
and AgZERO2t are respectively the aggregate value weighted and equally weighted zero daily return measures at month t. dGDP t, Termt, Cdefaultt and 
are respectively the change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the change in default spread. ***, **, and * denotes a rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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An interesting result in this table is that the change in real GDP growth rate is negatively 
correlated with future aggregate innovation, which is opposite to the results in the 
previous section. However, consistent with previous results, both term structure and 
default spread do not play any important role in explaining future aggregate innovation. 
Overall, while both term structure and default spread are not significantly correlated with 
future aggregate innovation, the relation between change in GDP growth rate and future 
aggregate innovation seems to be mixed. In contrast, the effects of aggregate liquidity on 
future aggregate innovation tend to be persistent. These results suggest the predictive 
power of aggregate liquidity on future innovation. 
1.4 Aggregate Liquidity, External Finance, and Aggregate Innovation 
1.4.1 Aggregate Liquidity and External Finance  
In the previous section, I document that stock market liquidity encourages innovation at 
the aggregate level. In this section, I investigate the underlying reasoning for this positive 
relationship. I hypothesize that cash flow and the availability of external capital are 
important determinants in the relationship between stock market liquidity and innovation. 
When the stock market becomes more liquid, firms easily raise external capital at lower 
costs to finance their innovation activities. This effect is more pronounced for small firms 
or firms with less cash flow.  
I first re-examine the effects of aggregate liquidity on a firm’s external finance. Butler et 
al. (2005) find that stock liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of raising 
external capital because both flotation costs and investment bank fees are lower when 
stock liquidity improves. I go a step further by investigating the effects of aggregate 
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liquidity on equity and debt issuances in the period from 1975 to 2005. Specifically, I use 
the follow regression: 
EFINi,t = α +β1AILLIQt + γXi,t-1 +µi +ηt + εi,t     (6) 
Where EFINi,t is external finance captured by equity and debt issuances of firm i in year t, 
AILLIQt is aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity (AgILLIQt) or zero daily return measures 
(AgZEROt) in year t , Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm and industry characteristics which include 
Tobin’s Q, size, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditures, tangibility, age, 
R&D to total assets, firm stock liquidity, cash, and Herfindahl index. The definitions of 
these variables are detailed in the appendix. µi is firm fixed effects and ηt is time fixed 
effects. 
I focus on external financing at the firm level because I want to examine both the effects 
of aggregate stock liquidity and firm’s characteristics on firm equity and debt issuances. 
The results from this model (6) are reported in table 11. 
Table 11 indicates that two aggregate liquidity measures significantly affect both equity 
and debt issuances. The absolute values of t-statistics of the coefficients for equity 
financing are greater than 9.36, while these values for debt financing are greater than 
3.64. Obviously, table 11 shows that the effects of aggregate liquidity are more 
pronounced on equity issuance. Consistently, firm stock liquidity are significantly 
correlated with equity and debt issuances and the relationship between firm stock 
liquidity and equity financing is much stronger than the relationship between firm stock 





Table 11: Debt and Equity Issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ISSEQUITYi,t ISSEQUITYi,t ISSDEBTi,t ISSDEBTi,t 
ILLIQi,t -0.010***  -0.001**  
 (-10.02)  (-2.21)  
ZEROi,t  -0.469***  -0.077*** 
  (-19.88)  (-5.15) 
AgILLIQt -0.133***  -0.056***  
 (-9.36)  (-5.06)  
AgZEROt  -0.133***  -0.050*** 
  (-6.82)  (-3.64) 
Qi,t-1 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (6.59) (6.50) (4.82) (4.72) 
LSIZEi,t-1 -0.058*** -0.066*** -0.002 -0.004* 
 (-8.15) (-9.36) (-1.15) (-1.83) 
Totaldebti,t-1 0.045** 0.049** -0.397*** -0.397*** 
 (2.33) (2.52) (-22.93) (-22.85) 
ROAi,t-1 -0.260*** -0.286*** 0.019 0.015 
 (-5.59) (-6.16) (1.10) (0.85) 
CAPXi,t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.00) (-1.01) (-3.77) (-3.72) 
TANGi,t-1 0.023 0.026 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.98) (1.11) (3.94) (3.97) 
LAGEi,t-1 -0.049*** -0.060*** -0.040*** -0.042*** 
 (-4.46) (-5.47) (-6.59) (-6.88) 
RDATi,t-1 1.093*** 1.071*** 0.073 0.069 
 (7.26) (7.18) (1.57) (1.48) 
CASHi,t-1 -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 (-5.52) (-5.53) (-4.77) (-4.78) 
HHIi,t-1 0.018 0.016 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.28) (1.14) (0.03) (-0.01) 
_cons 0.359*** 0.457*** 0.198*** 0.201*** 
 (12.55) (15.90) (9.56) (10.74) 
N 60,034 60,034 60,034 60,034 
R
2
 0.1704 0.1743 0.0056 0.0059 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model of external financing on aggregate liquidity 
and other control variables for the period from 1975 to 2005. ISSEQUITYi,t and ISSDEBTi,t is the equity 
and debt issuances for firm i in year t, respectively. ILLIQi,t and ZEROi,t are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
and zero daily return measures for firm i in year t. AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures in year t. Q, LSIZE, totaldebt, ROA, CAPX, 
TANG, RDAT, and CASH are respectively Tobin’s Q, logarithm of market capitalization, total debt ratio, 
return on assets, capital expenditure ratio, tangible assets ratio, R&D expenditures to total assets, and cash 
holding ratio. HHI is the Herfindahl index, and LAGE is logarithm of one plus firm age. ***, **, and * 




The results from table 11 also show that young firms or firms with high Tobin’Q or less 
cash holding tend to issue both more equity and debt. Firms with less capital expenditures 
or high tangible assets tend to issue more debt than equity. In contrast, small firms or 
firms with high R&D to total assets or less return on assets tend to raise more external 
equity than debt. 
The relationship between firm size and external financing is very straightforward. The 
literature documents that small firms are riskier and have less tangible assets, so they find 
it difficult to raise debt. As a result, they prefer to issue more equity to finance their 
activities. This external financing strategy is more pronounced when the stock market is 
in healthy. Similarly, the relationship between innovation and external financing is 
widely documented in the recent literature. Hall et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2009) 
show that the U.S. small firms mainly finance their innovation with equity and cash flow. 
Moreover, Atanassov et al. (2007) show that banks are reluctant to finance R&D projects 
because their outcomes very uncertain. Thus, R&D investments heavily depend on 
external capital resources from the stock markets. Consistent with this statement, the 
results in table 11 show that firms with high R&D investments usually issue more 
external equity rather than debt.  
1.4.2 Firm Characteristics and External Financing 
The role of external equity financing in encouraging R&D investments is widely 
documented in the recent literature. Brown et al. (2009) argue that young firms tend to 
finance their R&D by cash flow and external equity. Atanassov et al. (2007) document 
that U.S. public firms that create novel innovations rely more on external equity and 
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public debt. Hall et al. (2009) survey the current literature on financing R&D and indicate 
that equity is the main financial sources for R&D. 
From the evidence that cash flow and equity are important determinants of a firm’s R&D 
investments and the evidence in table 11 that small firms tend to issue more external 
financing, I hypothesize that the effects of stock market liquidity on external equity 
issuance is more pronounced for small firms. To test this hypothesis, every year I divide 
all firms into two groups based on their size. I then use the model (6) to regress the debt 
and equity issuances for firms in each group. The results from this regression model are 
reported in table 12 (panel A). 
Panel A of table 12 shows that when stock markets become more liquid, small firms only 
issue more equity but large firms issue both equity and debt. Furthermore, the coefficient 
of aggregate illiquidity for small firms is -0.188 while this figure for large firms is only -
0.073. This implies that when aggregate stock market liquidity improves by one standard 
deviation (0.072), small firms on average will increase their equity issuance by 1.35% 
whereas this figure for large firms is only 0.5%. This evidence supports the statement that 
small firms rely more on stock markets to raise external capital.  
Panel A of table 12 also presents that firm stock liquidity is an important determinant of 
equity issuance for both small and large firms. However, in contrast to the effects of 
aggregate stock market liquidity on equity issuance, the coefficient of firm stock liquidity 
for small firms is -0.008 while this figure for large firms is -0.037. Moreover, firm stock 
liquidity only affects debt issuance for large firms.  
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Table 12: Debt and Equity Issuance and Firm Characteristics 
 Panel A: Firm size Panel B: R&D investments 
 Small firms Large firms Firms with R&D Firms without R&D 
 ISSEQUITYi,t ISSDEBTi,t ISSEQUITYi,t ISSDEBTi,t ISSEQUITYi, ISSDEBTi,t ISSEQUITYi, ISSDEBTi,t 
ILLIQi,t -0.008*** -0.000 -0.037*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.006*** -0.002** 
 (-8.15) (-0.78) (-4.43) (-3.13) (-9.54) (-0.27) (-7.11) (-2.06) 
AgILLIQt -0.188*** -0.010 -0.073*** -0.056*** -0.175*** -0.027** -0.099*** -0.071*** 
 (-7.56) (-0.57) (-6.71) (-5.29) (-7.34) (-2.24) (-6.12) (-4.81) 
Qi,t-1 0.127*** 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.006*** 0.061*** 0.005*** 0.056*** 0.014*** 
 (6.92) (3.31) (4.43) (3.47) (5.65) (3.67) (6.68) (4.27) 
LSIZEi,t-1 -0.097*** 0.004 -0.036*** -0.008*** -0.072*** 0.002 -0.046*** -0.007** 
 (-7.44) (1.18) (-7.51) (-2.83) (-6.26) (0.79) (-7.53) (-2.14) 
Totaldebti,t-1 0.126*** -0.483*** 0.041** -0.374*** 0.085*** -0.376*** 0.025 -0.427*** 
 (5.12) (-15.47) (2.29) (-19.39) (3.04) (-20.79) (0.84) (-14.66) 
ROAi,t-1 -0.140** 0.003 -0.168*** 0.055** -0.279*** 0.020 -0.160*** -0.008 
 (-2.29) (0.14) (-3.03) (2.26) (-4.26) (1.02) (-2.73) (-0.22) 
CAPXi,t-1 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (2.86) (-2.17) (-2.30) (-6.49) (0.64) (-1.45) (-2.31) (-8.51) 
TANGi,t-1 0.006 0.108*** -0.004 0.057** -0.036 0.059*** 0.044 0.081*** 
 (0.21) (3.80) (-0.23) (2.31) (-0.97) (2.72) (1.40) (3.01) 
LAGEi,t-1 -0.020 -0.024** -0.059*** -0.030*** -0.068*** -0.021** -0.033*** -0.050*** 
 (-1.16) (-2.54) (-5.73) (-3.63) (-3.82) (-2.50) (-4.23) (-5.66) 
RDATi,t-1 1.037*** 0.107* 0.804*** 0.081 1.095*** 0.098** . . 
 (5.13) (1.77) (3.70) (1.49) (6.94) (2.05) . . 
CASHi,t-1 -0.144*** -0.083*** -0.064*** -0.081*** -0.168*** -0.083*** -0.168*** -0.078** 
 (-3.83) (-3.59) (-2.67) (-3.96) (-5.23) (-5.18) (-3.08) (-2.34) 
HHIi,t-1 0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.037 0.009 -0.009 0.003 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.51) (-0.13) (1.41) (0.59) (-0.75) (0.23) 
N 29,998 29,998 29,978 29,978 29,745 29,745 30,231 30,231 
R
2
 0.2126 0.0038 0.1302 0.0068 0.1911 0.0103 0.0547 0.0065 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression model of external financing on aggregate liquidity and other control variables for the period 
from 1975 to 2005. ISSEQUITYi,t and ISSDEBTi,t is the equity and debt issuances for firm i in year t, respectively. ILLIQi,t and ZEROi,t are the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures for firm i in year t. AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
and zero daily return measures in year t. Q, LSIZE, totaldebt, ROA, CAPX, TANG, RDAT, and CASH are respectively Tobin’s Q, logarithm of market 
capitalization, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditure ratio, tangible assets ratio, R&D expenditures to total assets, and cash holding ratio. 
HHI is the Herfindahl index, and LAGE is logarithm of one plus firm age. ***, **, and * denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 




As documented in Hall et al. (2009), the firms in the U.S. tend to finance their innovation 
projects by cash flow or equity. Thus, I expect that the effects of stock market liquidity 
on external financing are stronger for innovative firms. To test this prediction, I divide all 
firms into two groups: the groups of firms with and without R&D investments. I then use 
model (5) to examine the sensitivity of a firm’s financing to the stock market liquidity. 
The results are shown in panel B of table 12. 
The results in table 12 present that aggregate stock market liquidity only affects 
innovative firms’ decisions to issue more equity. In contrast, firms without R&D 
investments issue both debt and equity when stock markets become more liquid. 
However, the coefficient of aggregate stock market liquidity for innovative firms is -
0.175, which nearly doubles this figure for firms without R&D investments. This 
evidence suggests that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of raising 
external finance for innovative firms.  
1.4.3 Financing, Firm Size and R&D Investments 
The previous section shows that small firms tend to raise more equity than the large ones. 
Moreover, the current literature documents that small firms are riskier and tend to finance 
their R&D activities by cash holding and equity. This implies that small firms tend to be 
more sensitive to the stock market condition to finance their R&D than large firms. As a 
result, the effects of stock market liquidity on R&D are more pronounced for small firms. 
To test this hypothesis, every year I divide all these firms into two groups based on their 
size. I then aggregate all R&D expenditures for each group. Because aggregate R&D 
expenditures are non-stationary, I detrend them by taking the difference in their values (in 
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logs). I investigate the effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate R&D expenditures by 
running the regression model in section 1.3.1 (model 4).  
Table 13: Firm Size and Aggregate R&D Expenditures 










Intercept 0.085 0.079 0.064 0.070 
 
(1.55) (1.40) (1.34) (1.58) 
AgILLIQt -0.232**  -0.026  
 
(-2.24)  (-0.64)  
AgZEROt  -0.223*  0.059 
  (-2.09)  (1.63) 
AgRD1t-1 0.121 -0.197   
 
(0.59) (-0.95)   
AgRD2t-1   0.310 0.346 
 
  (0.98) (1.27) 
dGDPt-1 4.932 3.755 3.396** 2.767** 
 
(1.40) (1.03) (2.51) (2.08) 
termt-1 -0.013 0.016 0.000 -0.002 
 
(-0.52) (0.66) (0.01) (-0.19) 
Cdefaultt-1 -0.081 -0.040 0.038 0.034 
 
(-0.96) (-0.45) (1.27) (1.32) 
N 31 31 31 31 
R-square 0.1958 0.1352 0.1797 0.2188 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the results from the regression models of aggregate R&D expenditures for 
groups of firms with different size on aggregate liquidity measure and other macro variables in the period 
1976 to 2006. Every year, I divide all these firms into two groups based on their size. I then calculate the 
detrended aggregate patent for each group. AgRD1(2)t is aggregate R&D expenditures for firms in group 1 
(2) in year t. AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero 
daily return measures in year t. dGDPt, Termt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the change in GDP growth 
rate, term structure, and the change in default spread. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Table 13 summarizes the results from this regression model. These results show that 
aggregate stock market liquidity is significantly correlated with aggregate R&D 
expenditures for small firms. The absolute values of t-statistics of these coefficients are 
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greater than 2.09. In contrast, both aggregate liquidity measures are insignificantly related 
to aggregate R&D expenditures for large firms. This evidence indicates that large firms 
do not rely on equity markets to finance their R&D investments. 
1.4.4 Aggregate Liquidity and Equity Issuance Frequency 
In this section, I robustly check the effects of aggregate liquidity on innovation through 
financing mechanisms by focusing on the relationship between aggregate liquidity and 
the average frequency of an innovative firm raising equity. I define an innovative firm as 
a firm invests in R&D one year around the year it issues equity. As shown in section 
1.3.3.2, I simply classify all firms into two groups: high tech and non-high tech ones. 
Every year, I record the number of innovative firms issuing equity to total number of 
firms in each group and examine whether the effects of aggregate liquidity on this ratio is 
stronger for high tech industries. As expected, my results (not reported) show that the 
relationship between aggregate liquidity and the ratio of innovative firms issuing equity is 
more pronounced for firms in high tech industries.  
1.5 Aggregate Liquidity, Size, and Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.5.1 Aggregate Liquidity, Innovation, and Mergers and Acquisitions 
In addition to the cost of raising external capital, merger and acquisition activities are 
hypothesized to drive the effects of aggregate stock market liquidity on innovation. In 
this section, I investigate the second mechanism that is the effect of aggregate liquidity 
on merger and acquisition activity. Specifically, I combine two strands of literature: the 
relation between aggregate liquidity and merger and acquisition as well as the relation 
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between innovation and merger and acquisition. I hypothesize that an increase in stock 
market liquidity will enhance merger and acquisition with innovation. 
The first strand of literature suggests that the aggregate liquidity level tends to cause 
industry merger waves. Using the spread between the average rates charged for 
commercial and industrial loans and the fed funds rate to proxy for macro liquidity level, 
Harford (2005) shows that this capital liquidity plays an important role in explaining the 
aggregate merger waves. He finds that the merger activities tend to increase with the 
availability of capital in the markets. Consistently, Xu and Zhao (2009) use the aggregate 
liquidity measures under the framework of Holmström and Tirole (2001) which combines 
both aggregate corporate asset liquidity and market asset liquidity and find that higher 
aggregate liquidity is followed by more merger activity in the next period. 
Literature on the relation between innovation and merger and acquisition suggests that 
more innovative companies tend to be acquirers while less innovative companies are 
more likely to be acquired (Zhao (2009), and Bena and Li (2013)). Moreover, Zhao 
(2009) documents that among the bidders, the relatively more innovative ones are less 
likely to complete a deal and less innovative bidders benefit more from acquisitions. She 
concludes that acquisitions help firms’ innovation efforts. 
I focus on merger and acquisition activities with innovation. My merger and acquisition 
data is largely based on Bena and Li (2013). As shown in figure 2, the number of targets 
with patent tends to be high following the high level of aggregate liquidity. This pattern is 







Figure 2: Stock Market Illiquidity and Targets with Patent 
Notes: This figure shows time-series plots of number of targets with patent and the aggregate Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure (AgLIQ). The gray bars are the number of all targets with patent in a year (the 
left axis). The line is the detrended AgLIQ (the right axis) which is the change in this illiquidity measure 
(in logs).  Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is first calculated for each firm for each year. Then the value 
–weighted cross-sectional average for each year is calculated. More precise definition is in section II.C. 
Note that AgLIQ reflects illiquidity, so a high value means that stock markets are illiquid. 
 
I check this positive relation by running the regression model of aggregate targets with 
patents or total number of deals with patent on aggregate liquidity and other macro 
variables which are mentioned in section 1.3.1. I scale targets with patent by total targets 
in the same year and total number of deals with patent by the total number of deals in the 
same year. I use the same framework as shown in section 1.3.1 to deal with non-
stationary time series. I then run the regression model of ratios of targets with patent and 
deals with patent on aggregate liquidity and other macro-variables as mentioned in 














































































































Aggregate Illiquidity and Targets with Patent 
Targets with patent
Aggregate Illiquidity (right axis)
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Table 14: Aggregate Liquidity and Aggregate Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
  Target with patent rate All deal with patent rate 
 
Targetratet+2 Targetratet+2 Targetratet+2 Targetratet+1 Dealratet+2 Dealratet+2 Dealratet+2 Dealratet+1 
Intercept -0.054 -0.037 -0.035 0.028 -0.023 -0.020 -0.036 -0.005 
 
(-0.72) -0.6 (-0.42) (0.36) (-0.58) (-0.48) (-0.74) (-0.15) 
AgILLIQt -0.603*** -0.576**    -0.251* -0.229  
 
 
(-2.83) (-2.76)    (-1.85) (-1.36)  
 AgZEROt 
 
 -0.489 0.067 
 
 -0.318* -0.205* 
 
 
 (-2.16)** (0.25) 
 
 (-1.75) (-1.84) 
Targetratet -0.472* -0.512* -0.236 -0.499*** 
 
  





    -0.280 -0.308 -0.229 -0.480*** 
 
 
    (-1.53) (-1.36) (-0.90) (-2.23) 
dGDPt 
 




























(0.31) (-0.24)   
 
(-0.7) (-1.62) 
 N  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
R-square 0.2519 0.3979 0.3176 0.2497 0.2006 0.3310 0.3632 0.2877 
 
Notes: This table shows the effects of aggregate liquidity on merger and acquisition in the period from 1984 to 2006. Targetratet+2(1) is the ratio of 
number of targets with patent to total number of targets next two (one) years. Dealratet+2(1) is the ratio of number of deal with patent to total number of 
deals next two (one) years. AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures in year t. 
dGDPt, Ctermt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the change in GDP growth rate, the change in term structure, and the change in default spread. The 




These results show that the aggregate liquidity is significantly positively correlated with 
both aggregate number of targets with patent and aggregate number of deals with patent, 
but the effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate number of targets with patent are 
stronger
14
. This evidence shows that aggregate liquidity is an important determinant of 
merger and acquisition activities with patents.  
1.5.2 Merger and Acquisition, Firm Size, and Innovation 
Using the ratio of R&D expenditures to size to capture innovation, the current literature 
documents that small firms are more innovative. Cremers et al. (2009) find that small 
firms tend to be acquired by large firms. Moreover, Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) develop 
a model and provide empirical evidence to show that large firms optimally decide to 
purchase small innovative firms and conduct less R&D than small ones. However, using 
patenting activity, large firms have more patent counts and higher citations per patent.  
This evidence indicates that merger and acquisition activity is an important channel for 
firms to generate innovation: large firms acquire innovation from small firms and small 
firms benefit from this deal. This result indicates that large firms play different roles in 
patenting activity. 
Table 15 shows the effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate patent for both small and 
large firms. As discussed in the previous section, I just focus on the firms with patents. 
Every year, I divide all these firms into two groups based on their market capitalization in 
the previous two years. I allow a two year gap to make sure that firms have time to raise 
                                                          
14
 In addition to the significantly positive relations between aggregate stock market liquidity and merger 
and acquisition activities with patents, I document that, consistent with Xu and Zhao (2009), aggregate 
stock liquidity is positively correlated with aggregate number of targets or deals. However, this effect is 
weaker than the effects of aggregate stock liquidity on deals or targets involving patents. 
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external capital to finance their innovation activity and that large firms can acquire small 
firms if they have a plan to do so. 
Table 15: Firm Size and Aggregate Number of Patents 
 










Intercept 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.011 
 
(0.09) (0.47) (1.43) (1.14) 
AgILLIQt -0.195*   -0.165*** 
 
 
(-1.82)   (-2.83) 
 AgZEROt  0.140  -0.384** 
  (0.5)  (-1.93) 




  AgINNO2t    0.610*** 0.609*** 
 
   (7.46) (7.50) 
dGDPt 1.850* 1.907* 1.863*** 1.797*** 
 
(1.87) (1.90) (2.90) (2.77) 
termt 0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 
 
(0.27) (0.04) (-1.53) (-1.28) 
Cdefaultt -0.040 -0.050 -0.056 -0.061 
 
(-0.55) (-0.68) (-1.16) (-1.28) 
N 372 372 372 372 
Adj R-square 0.0101 0.0042 0.3639 0.3624 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression models of aggregate innovation for groups of firms 
with different size on aggregate liquidity measure and other macro variables during the prior 12 months in 
the period 1976 to 2006. Every year, I divide all these firms into two groups based on their size in two 
previous years. I then calculate the detrended aggregate patent for each group. AgINNO1(2)t+12 is aggregate 
number of patent applications for firms in group 1 (2) next year (12 months). AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are 
respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures at month t. dGDP t, 
Termt, Cdefaultt and are respectively the change in GDP growth rate, term structure, and the change in 
default spread. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The results in table 15 show that these effects are stronger for large firms than for small 
ones. The value of t-statistic of aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity measure is -2.83, and 
of aggregate zero daily return is -1.93. This evidence indicates that large firm innovation 
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captured by patenting activity is more sensitive to aggregate liquidity. This finding is also 
consistent with the theory of merger and acquisition in innovation, showing that small 
firms tend to invest more in R&D but large firms tend to acquire small innovative firms. 
1.5.3 Aggregate Liquidity and Merger and Acquisition Frequency 
I robustly check the relationship between aggregate liquidity and merger and acquisition 
with innovation by examining the effects of aggregate liquidity on the propensity of an 
innovative firm being an acquisition target. To simplify my analysis, I compute the ratios 
of number of targets to total number of firms in two groups: high tech and non-high tech. 
I then investigate the effects of aggregate liquidity on these ratios. My results (not 
reported) show that this effect is stronger for firms in high tech industries. 
1.6 Aggregate Liquidity and Firm Innovation 
In the previous sections, I mainly focus on the effects of aggregate liquidity on aggregate 
innovation. In this section, I robustly check the effects of aggregate liquidity on 
innovation at firm level. I use the most common patent database, the NBER patent 
database, from 1976 to 2002 to calculate several proxies for firm innovation: the log of 
number of patents scaled by size, the number of patents, the adjusted number of patent 
citations per patent scaled by size, as well as the adjusted number of patent citations per 
patent, and the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. These variables are widely used 
in the current literature (e.g. Hall et al. (2005), and Atanassov et al. (2007)). 
To investigate the effects of aggregate liquidity on firm innovation, I run the regression 
of firm innovation proxies on aggregate liquidity measures and other control variables in 
the previous year. Specifically, I use the follow regression: 
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INNOi,t+1 = α +β1AILLIQt + γXi,t +µi +ηt+1 + εi,t+1    (7) 
where INNOi,t+1 is a firm innovation proxy which can be the log of number of patents 
scaled by size, the number of patents, the adjusted number of patent citations per patent 
scaled by size, or the adjusted number of patent citations per patent of firm 1 at year t +1. 
AILLIQt is aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity (AgILLIQt) or zero daily return measures 
(AgZERQt) in year t, Xi,t is a vector of firm and industry characteristics which include lag 
innovation proxies, Tobin’s Q, size, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditures, 
tangibility, age, R&D to total assets, firm stock liquidity, cash, KZ-index and Herfindahl 
index. The definitions of these variables are detailed in the appendix. µi is firm fixed 
effects and ηt is time fixed effects. 
Table 16 summarizes the results from this regression model. These results show that both 
aggregate liquidity measures are significantly correlated with all firm innovation proxies. 
The absolute values of t-statistics of these coefficients in the models with time fixed 
effects are greater than 3.10. The absolute values of t-statistics of these coefficients in the 
models without time fixed effects are greater than 2.12. This evidence indicates that 
aggregate liquidity is an important determinant of firm innovation. 
I also use ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets to measure firm innovation. Because 
R&D expenditures are inputs of a firm innovation process, I run the regression model (6) 
of R&D expenditure ratio on contemporaneous liquidity measures and other firm 
characteristics from the previous year. Consistently, aggregate liquidity measured by 
aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity and aggregate zero daily returns are significantly 
positively correlated with firm innovation captured by R&D expenditures to total assets 






Table 16: Market Stock Liquidity and Firm Innovation 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lpatentsi,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 clpatenti,t+1 Lpcitei,t+1 Lpcitei,t+1 
ILLIQi,t 0.000*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.000 0.000 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (2.86) (1.72) (1.72) (0.30) (0.30) (-1.89) (-1.94) 
AgILLIQt   -0.470***  -0.250***  -1.610*** 
   (-5.57)  (-4.14)  (-11.86) 
Lpatenti,t    0.421*** -0.579***   
    (23.61) (-32.53)   
Lpcitei,t       0.126*** 
       (13.54) 
Qi,t -0.000* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.010** -0.009** 
 (-1.80) (-2.79) (-2.79) (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.39) (-2.24) 
LSIZEi,t -0.002*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 
 (-8.72) (9.05) (9.05) (8.17) (8.17) (2.97) (2.77) 
Totaldebti,t -0.001 0.041 0.041 0.014 0.014 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.56) (0.94) (0.94) (0.49) (0.49) (-0.11) (-0.14) 
ROAi,t -0.003*** -0.046 -0.046 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-3.26) (-0.89) (-0.89) (0.12) (0.12) (-0.01) (-0.03) 
CAPXi,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.42) (1.01) (1.01) (1.07) (1.07) (0.70) (0.65) 
TANGi,t -0.002 0.177** 0.177** 0.086* 0.086* 0.224*** 0.198*** 
 (-1.18) (2.51) (2.51) (1.93) (1.93) (3.37) (3.29) 
LAGEi,t -0.000 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.057** 0.057** 0.129*** 0.101*** 
 (-0.35) (3.37) (3.37) (2.35) (2.35) (3.87) (3.40) 
RDATi,t 0.001 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.226** 0.226** 0.485*** 0.398*** 
 (0.54) (4.18) (4.18) (2.46) (2.46) (2.93) (2.60) 
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Table 16: Market Stock Liquidity and Firm Innovation (continued) 
 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lpatentsi,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 Lpatenti,t+1 clpatenti,t+1 Lpcitei,t+1 Lpcitei,t+1 
        
CASHi,t -0.001 0.076 0.076 0.033 0.033 0.202*** 0.174*** 
 (-1.25) (1.46) (1.46) (0.88) (0.88) (3.26) (3.05) 
HHIi,t -0.000 -0.020 -0.020 -0.009 -0.009 0.087 0.074 
 (-0.55) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.19) (-0.19) (1.25) (1.18) 
Kzindexi,t -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.49) (2.71) (2.71) (2.58) (2.58) (1.53) (1.56) 
_cons 0.020*** -0.159 -0.245** -0.044 -0.090 0.186** -0.101 
 (14.57) (-1.62) (-2.33) (-0.71) (-1.37) (2.17) (-1.08) 
Method F, T, OLS F, T, OLS F, T, OLS F, T, OLS F, T, OLS F, T, OLS F, T, OLS 
N 55,375 55,375 55,375 55,375 55,375 55,375 55,375 
R
2
 0.0625 0.1677 0.1677 0.7345 0.0731 0.0531 0.2776 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model of firm innovation on aggregate liquidity and other control variables for the period  1976 
to 2002. Lpatentsi,t+1 is the logarithm of number of patents scaled by size of firm i in year t+1, lpatenti,t+1 , clpatenti,t+1 and lpcitei,t+1 are respectively the 
logarithm of the number of patents, the change in the logarithm of the number of patents, and the adjusted number of patent citations per patent of firm i 
at year t +1. ILLIQi,t and AgILLIQt are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity and the aggregate Amihud (2002) liquidity in year t. Q, LSIZE, totaldebt, ROA, 
CAPX, TANG, RDAT, and CASH are respectively Tobin’s Q, logarithm of market capitalization, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditure 
ratio, tangible assets ratio, R&D expenditures to total assets, and cash holding ratio. HHI is the Herfindahl index, KZindex is Kaplan and Zingales 







Different from the relationship between aggregate liquidity and firm innovation, the 
relationship between firm’s stock liquidity and firm innovation is not persistent. Fang et 
al. (2013) use the sample from 1994 to 2005 and find that firm’s stock liquidity impedes 
firm innovation. In contrast, Dass et al. (2012) document opposite effects of firm’s stock 
liquidity and firm innovation. Moreover, Dass et al. (2012) point out two reasons why 
their results differ from those in Fang et al. (2013). First, because firm innovation is a 
non-stationary process, controlling for lag innovation is necessary when examining the 
effects of stock liquidity on firm innovation. Second, the sample period used in Fang et 
al. (2013) is quite “special”, meaning that this sample period includes some years before 
and after the innovation peak, and the “years around decimalization 2000-2002 were 
years of economic slowdown”
15
. Thus, “it is not surprising that the change in patent 
applications over this period is strongly related to prior level of patenting and not 
including lagged levels would bias the results” (Dass et al. (2013)). 
I use the longer sample period from 1976 to 2002 and document that my results support 
Dass et al.’s (2012) suggestions. As shown in table 16, when lag innovation proxies are 
not included in the regression models, stock liquidity is negatively related to future firm 
innovation, consistent with the findings by Fang et al. (2013). However, this relation 
becomes insignificant or even positive when lag innovation proxies are controlled. 
Moreover, besides two problems in Fang et al. (2013) pointed out by Dass et al. (2012), 
Hall et al. (2001, 2005, and 2009) show that the sample of some ending years of the 
database contain serious errors because almost all patents applied for had not yet 
                                                          
15
 More detail is shown in Dass et al. (2012). 
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appeared in the database. They suggest that the researchers should “take at least a 3-year 
“safety lag” when dating patents.”  
Table 16 also shows that the effects of some firm’s characteristics on firm innovation 
depend on innovation proxy. Size and R&D expenditures are important characteristics to 
determine firm innovation. However, their effects on firm innovation are not persistent. 
Using the logarithm of number of patents or the logarithm of citation per patent to proxy 
for firm innovation, I document that both size and R&D expenditures are significantly 
positively correlated with firm innovation in future. This evidence implies that large 
firms or firms with high R&D expenditures tend to achieve a greater number of patents as 
well as more important patents. However, when the logarithm of number of patents or the 
logarithm of citation per patent are scaled by size, both size and R&D expenditures are 
significantly negatively correlated with firm innovation in the future. This means that 
small firms are more innovative. My evidence cautions the use of proxies for firm 
innovation in examining the relation between firm’s characteristics and firm innovation. 
I also check the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation captured by 
R&D expenditures. The results in table 17 show that that stock liquidity will enhance 
R&D investments. The t-statistics of the coefficients of both aggregate Amahud (2002) 
illiquidity and zero daily returns is from -7.66 to -5.68. Similarly, firm stock liquidity is 
also positively correlated with R&D investments. Furthermore, the aggregate stock 
market liquidity is positively correlated with firm R&D investments even after 





Table 17: Market Stock Liquidity and Firm R&D Investments 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RDATt RDATt RDATt RDATt 
ILLIQi,t -0.001*** -0.001***   
 (-6.62) (-6.62)   
ZEROt   -0.042*** -0.042*** 
   (-9.24) (-9.24) 
AgILLIQt  -0.018***   
  (-7.66)   
AgZEROt    -0.016*** 
    (-5.68) 
Qi,t-1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (7.72) (7.72) (7.63) (7.63) 
LSIZEi,t-1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-8.66) (-8.66) (-9.48) (-9.48) 
Totaldebti,t-1 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (-5.81) (-5.81) (-5.74) (-5.74) 
ROAi,t-1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-0.79) (-0.79) (-1.08) (-1.08) 
CAPXi,t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.80) (0.80) 
TANGi,t-1 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (4.54) (4.54) (4.59) (4.59) 
LAGEi,t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-1.44) (-1.44) (-2.06) (-2.06) 
RDATi,t-1 0.648*** 0.648*** 0.646*** 0.646*** 
 (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) 
CASHi,t-1 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (2.08) (2.08) (2.09) (2.09) 
HHIi,t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.55) (0.55) 
Kzindexi,t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.51) (1.51) (1.73) (1.73) 
_cons 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (8.43) (9.09) (10.15) (10.22) 
N 60,034 60,034 60,034 60,034 
R
2
 0.6780 0.6780 0.6777 0.6777 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model of firm R&D investments on aggregate 
liquidity and other control variables for period is from 1976 to 2006. ILLIQi,t and ZEROi,t are the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures for firm i in year t. AgILLIQt and AgZEROt are 
respectively the aggregate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and zero daily return measures in year t.  Q, LSIZE, 
totaldebt, ROA, CAPX, TANG, RDAT, and CASH are respectively Tobin’s Q, logarithm of market 
capitalization, total debt ratio, return on assets, capital expenditure ratio, tangible assets ratio, R&D 
expenditures to total assets, and cash holding ratio. HHI is the Herfindahl index, KZindex is Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) index, and LAGE is logarithm of one plus firm age. ***, **, and * denotes a rejection of 





This essay investigates the effects of stock market liquidity on innovation for U.S. 
publicly traded firms at both the aggregate and the firm levels. I find that aggregate 
liquidity significantly affects aggregate innovation captured by aggregate number of 
patent applications or aggregate R&D expenditures. This finding indicates that aggregate 
innovation will improve when stock markets become more liquid and that aggregate 
stock liquidity is an important determinant of aggregate innovation. 
I then provide two important underlying mechanisms for these effects. First, an increase 
in stock market liquidity will reduce the cost of raising external capital, thus encouraging 
firms, especially small firms or innovative ones, to issue more equity and debt to finance 
their innovation activity. Using aggregate R&D expenditures to proxy for aggregate 
innovation, I document that the relation between aggregate liquidity and aggregate R&D 
expenditures is stronger for a group of small firms. 
 Second, higher stock market liquidity increases firm valuation and reduces transaction 
costs, which motivates large firms to buy innovation from small firms through merger 
and acquisition activities. My essay shows that aggregate stock liquidity is significantly 
correlated with the merger and acquisition deals with patents as well as with the number 
of targets with patents. I also find that although the relation between aggregate liquidity 
and R&D expenditures are more pronounced for a group of small firms, I also show that 
the effect of aggregate liquidity on aggregate number of patents is stronger for the group 
of large firms. Moreover, I show that merger and acquisition activities with patents 
increase with stock market liquidity. This evidence indicates that small firms will invest 
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more in R&D when stock markets become more liquid, then will be acquired by  large 
firms.  
At firm level, these effects hold. Using several proxies for firm innovation: the log of 
number of patents scaled by size, the number of patents, the adjusted number of patent 
citations per patent scaled by size, as well as the adjusted number of patent citations per 
patent, and the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets to capture firm innovation, I find 
that aggregate liquidity is significantly correlated with firm innovation. This result is also 
persistent when I use several models with different specifications. 
These results contribute to the understanding of the link between finance and economic 
growth. A large amount of literature lists several factors affecting innovation as well as 
economic growth such as market competition, the world economy and international trade, 
human capital, etc. I complement these findings by examining the effects of stock market 
liquidity on innovation at both aggregate and firm levels as well as provide two important 
mechanisms that connect finance to economic growth. I also suggest a channel to link 





CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC GROWTH OPTIONS, UNCERTAINTY AND 
R&D INVESTMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
Under the real option framework (Pindyck (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Abel et 
al. (1996)), firms invest less when facing high uncertainty. The reasoning behind this 
argument is that capital investments are (at least partially) irreversible and costly. Thus, 
when uncertainty increases, the value of option to wait will also go up, and firms tend to 
wait rather than immediately undertake capital investments to maximize their value. This 
approach has succeeded to explain the inverse relationship between capital investments 
and firms’ idiosyncratic volatility (Leahy and Whited (1996), and Bulan (2005)).   
Although the real options analysis has become a main stream in finance, it has often been 
based on two specific assumptions (Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998)): (1) a firm has a 
monopoly over an investment opportunity and (2) its action does not affect either the 
prices or market structure. These assumptions can be reasonable when the product 
markets are less competitive or monopolistic such as natural resource industries. 
However, they seem to be less realistic when the product markets become more 
competitive because other potential competitors can easily seize the growth opportunities. 
In such markets, it is usually recognized that early investment, especially R&D 
investment, is associated with greater ability to expand in the future. When a firm 
inaugurates a new product or a product with new technology, the value of other existing 
products in that market will deteriorate. For example, Nokia was the largest vendor of 
mobile phones in 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s. However, it lacked behind the 
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smartphone markets, causing its share price to fall from $40 in late 2007 to under $2 in 
mid-2012. In 2013, its mobile business was then acquired by Microsoft. 
Due to these limitations in the standard real option framework, the current literature has 
relaxed these assumptions to examine the effects of uncertainty on firm’s investment 
decision. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) develop a model to show that firms can adopt a 
new technology sooner because of potential competitors. Grenadier (2002) documents 
that “exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a 
strategic equilibrium.” Further, his model shows that the value of option to wait is 
drastically eroded due to competition and firms can invest at near the zero net present 
value threshold. More importantly, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) develop a strategic 
growth option model to show that under imperfect competition, uncertainty may 
encourage investment in growth options. The reasoning behind this model is that due to 
other potential competitors, not investing may lead another competitor to seize the 
opportunity while “immediate action may discourage entrants and enhance market share 
and profits” (Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998)). This theory also considers an initial 
investment as the acquisition of growth opportunities relative to other competitors, which 
allows the firm to take a competitive advantage. Moreover, under the imperfect 
competition environment, firm’s profits are convex in demand. Therefore, when strategic 
investment has a significant preemptive effect, it will result in higher market share, and 
thus a greater convexity of ex post profits relative to the case of no investment in growth 
options. The greater convexity of profits will lead to high expected cash flows. As a 
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result, increased uncertainty can encourage investment in growth options when this 
strategic advantage is strong
16
. 
Although strategic growth option analysis theoretically predicts the positive relationship 
between uncertainty and firm’s investments, the empirical evidence is still mixed.  
Minton and Schrand (1999) estimate cash flow volatility and average R&D investments 
during the same period and find that this relation is negative. Czarnitzki and Toole (2011) 
use the volatility of sales of innovative products as a proxy for uncertainty and document 
that this volatility is negatively related to R&D investments in absolute value. Stein and 
Stone (2012) re-examine this relationship and suggest that the negative relation between 
uncertainty and R&D investments may be caused by an endogeneity problem. 
Instrumenting for oil and currency prices and volatility, they find that uncertainty is 




In this essay, I apply the strategic growth option framework to examine the dynamic 
relationship between firms’ R&D investments and firm uncertainty. Using the 
idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns to proxy for firm’s uncertainty and considering 
                                                          
16
 Although competitive advantage takes many forms, “a firm is said to have a competitive advantage when 
it is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors” (Barney, 1991). Thus if firms want to enhance their competitive advantages, they 
must have some strategies which are valuable and difficult to imitate (Barney 1991, and Lengnick-Hall 
1992). As shown in the literature on strategic management, R&D investments do well to generate firms’ 
competitive advantages, because beyond their benefits mentioned above, the outcomes of these investments 
are difficult to imitate (Lengnick-Hall 1992). Importantly, this literature documents the firms’ innovations 
as the cornerstones of their competitive advantages (Porter and Millar (1985), Barney (1991), and 
Lengnick-Hall (1992)). 
17
 Stein and Stone (2012)’s “perhaps- reason” that uncertainty may increase the value of put options is 
opposite to the theoretical and empirical evidence documented in the literature (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, 
Abel et al. 1996, and Berger et al. 1996). If the value of put options increases, firms have more 
opportunities to sell capital assets at lower costs (Abel et al. (1996)). As a result, “the put option increases 
the incentive to invest” more in capital (Abel et al. (1996)), and thus reduces R&D investments to 




the endogeneity problem in the relationship between firm’s uncertainty and R&D, I 
uncover that, unlike capital investments, R&D investments increase with firm 
uncertainty. Consistent with the strategic growth options theory, I document that firm’s 
uncertainty increases R&D investments
18
 because R&D could potentially generate 
growth opportunities which enhance competitive advantages for firms in the future. 
I further show that this strategic advantage is more important for less innovative firms or 
firms in more competitive industries because the competition and the fear of preemption 
drastically diminish the value of their options to wait. Consistent with this argument, I 
find that the positive relationship between uncertainty and change in R&D investments is 
more pronounced for these firms.  
The effects of idiosyncratic volatility on corporate investment policies also depend on the 
firm’s size. Seru (2010) and Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) document that large firms 
conduct less R&D (scaled by firm’s size) than small ones; thus they are less innovative. 
Moreover, the strategic advantage is more valuable for the large firms because they have 
less operating flexibility. As a result, large firms tend to invest more in R&D and less in 
capital expenditures when their idiosyncratic volatility increases. My empirical evidence 
supports this hypothesis. 
Although I estimate the stock idiosyncratic volatility in different windows, this volatility 
may be endogenous with corporate investment policies. Roberts and Whited (2012) 
                                                          
18
 While both capital investments and R&D investments are important drivers for firm value and economic 
growth, R&D investments are different from capital investments in several ways. First, R&D investments 
usually drive the new technological progress and would generate the new physical capital and thus increase 
the productivity of physical investment (Lin, 2012). Second, while capital investments exercise or “kill” the 
real option to invest (Pindyck, 1991), R&D investments tend to generate growth options for the firm and 
enhance its competitive advantages in the future. This benefit of R&D investments is more pronounced 
under a competitive environment in which the value of growth options is easily expires.  
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document three main sources of endogeneity: simultaneity, omitted variables, and 
measurement errors. I am also concerned with these issues and address them by using 
different econometric methods as well as considering alternative measures to proxy for 
Tobin’s Q. 
First, it is possible that there is a causal relation between uncertainty and investments. 
Uncertainty can affect the change in investment policies and the change in investment 
strategies also lead to a change in idiosyncratic volatility in the future. On the one hand, 
firms with greater proportion of R&D investments in the future tend to have higher 
uncertainty because R&D investments are usually associated with new and untested 
technologies (Chan et al. (2001)). On the other hand, idiosyncratic volatility also affects 
corporate investment strategies. Because firms with high uncertainty will have a high 
value of option to wait, they may have incentives to invest in R&D rather than in capital 
expenditures since while capital investments exercise or “kill” real options to invest 
(Pindyck, 1991), R&D investments tend to generate growth options. Thus, this interactive 
relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and corporate investments calls for a 
simultaneous estimate. I use the simultaneous equation methods instead of panel data 
ones with firm-specific and time fixed effects.  
Second, if Tobin’s Q were an imperfect measure of investment opportunities, this would 
also lead to omitted variable bias in empirical estimate, and there may exist some latent 
variables affecting both uncertainty and investments. I employ instrumental variables for 
idiosyncratic volatility by using the market stock return volatility and the aggregate 
investments as well as some “internal” instruments: Tobin’s Q, replacement costs, 
profitability, and stock returns. My intuition is that the effects of uncertainty on corporate 
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investments vary and may be impacted by macroeconomic variables. I find that 
uncertainty remains a statistically significant predictor of the change in corporate 
investments.  
Different from current empirical literature on the effect of uncertainty on R&D 
investments (Minton and Schrand (1999), Czarnitzki and Toole (2011, and 2012), and 
Stein and Stone (2012)) which are mainly based on the real option analysis, my essay 
applies the strategic growth option framework to analyze the relationship between 
uncertainty and R&D investments. In addition, my essay is also largely related to the 
literature on innovation, firm characteristics, and competitive advantage (e.g. Eberhart et 
al. (2004), Seru (2010), and Phillips and Zhdanow, (2012)). However, while these studies 
focus on the benefits of R&D investments or the relation between firm characteristics and 
innovation, I investigate the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on R&D investment 
decisions.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical essay using the strategic growth 
option model to investigate the relationship between uncertainty and R&D investments. 
My essay also contributes to the literature on the effects of uncertainty on corporate 
investments by documenting that the incentives to enhance a firm’s competitive 
advantage are main forces that drive the positive relation between a firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk and its R&D investments.  
The rest of the essay is organized as follow. The next section reviews literature and 
presents hypothesis development. Section 2.3 presents methodology and section 2.4 
briefly introduces the data collection and descriptive statistics. In section 2.5, I examine 
the effects of uncertainty on corporate investment policies, and investigate the relation 
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between uncertainty, corporate investment policies and firms’ characteristics in section 
2.6. The relation between idiosyncratic volatility, corporate investment policies and 
industries will be examined in section 2.7. Section 2.8 documents the benefits of increase 
in R&D investments in reducing firms’ idiosyncratic volatility in future. Section 2.9 will 
robustly test the results, and section 2.10 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In the perfect capital markets, only the systematic component of risk is relevant for 
investment decisions. In contrast, a firm cannot fully diversify its operations in reality. As 
a result, both theoretical models and empirical evidence show that uncertainty matters for 
investment decisions. However, this literature focuses neither on the effects of 
idiosyncratic volatility on R&D investments nor on the change in corporate investment 
policies.  
The literature on irreversible investments assumes that the adjustment costs are 
asymmetric and nonlinear with the costs of some input stocks. With adjustment costs, not 
investing allows firms to maintain its option to invest if the future business conditions 
become more attractive. When firms decide to make a capital investment decision, they 
will exercise or “kill” their options to wait (Pindyck 1991). Moreover, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) show that combination of uncertainty and irreversibility in investment will 
generate the region of inaction where a firm prefers to wait rather than immediately 
invest. Higher uncertainty enlarges this region and discourages investments. Thus, the 
relation between uncertainty and investments should be negative. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Leahy and Whited (1996), and Bulan (2005) use stock return idiosyncratic 
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volatility to proxy for uncertainty and find that this volatility will depress capital 
investments.  
This negative relation is also supported by the literature on managerial risk aversion 
(Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012). A risk-averse investor will be concerned with un-
diversifiable risk, thus will consider the covariance of a firm and market returns rather 
than variance of a firm’s returns. By contrast, top executives hold undiversified stakes in 
their companies because they are not permitted to short their own stocks. Because 
investment decisions are made by top executives, if they are risk averse, they might 
underinvest when firm-specific uncertainty increases. Moreover, Panousi and 
Papanikolaou (2012) document that the negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and 
capital investments is more pronounced for firms with high managerial ownership. 
In contrast to the traditional real option theory, the strategic growth option framework 
shows that the effect of uncertainty on investment is ambiguous under imperfect 
competition. This theory documents that although the value of not investing increases 
with rising uncertainty, the value of investing in growth option also increase due to the 
preemptive effects (Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998)). Thus, when these preemptive effects 
are high, increased uncertainty will lead to high investment. 
Although R&D investment is an important driver for firm value and economic 
development, the effects of uncertainty on this investment is theoretically neglected. 
Bloom (2007) develops a model to show that R&D investments are very persistent 
because the marginal effect of uncertainty on R&D will be negative when firms increase 
R&D investments but be positive when firms reduce R&D investments. Thus, he calls for 
empirical research to examine this relation. Minton and Schrand (1999) calculate the cash 
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flow volatility over the six-year period and examine its impacts on the contemporaneous 
average corporate investments during the same period. They find that this cash flow 
volatility is contemporaneously negatively related to average capital investments, R&D 
and advertising. Although the results are interesting, this method also shows some 
weaknesses. First, the firm’s characteristics may be different before or after it makes 
investment decisions, which could be problematic given that the average computation of 
these characteristics over a long period of time (6 years) may not show their true relation. 
For example, firms with low idiosyncratic risk will invest more, but when they invest 
more, their idiosyncratic volatility will increase (Duarte et al. (2011)). Second, the 
volatility may be endogenous with corporate investment policies (Roberts and Whited 
(2012)).  
Czarnitzki and Toole (2007, 2011, and 2012) examine a panel of German manufacturing 
firms and find that firms will invest less in R&D when the absolute value when their sales 
of innovative products become more volatile. While the volatility of sales of innovative 
products may provide a good proxy for uncertainty, it may be highly correlated and 
endogenous with R&D investments and may not reflect the uncertainty of total sales or a 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Further, they measure R&D investments in the log of absolute 
value of R&D, which may be dominated by firms with large R&D expenditures. 
Moreover, their estimated effects may be driven by the omitted control variables such as 
size, profitability or cash flow. 
In contrast, Stein and Stone (2012) find that uncertainty captured by implied volatility 
from equity options will increase R&D investments by using “external” instrument 
variables (commodities prices). However, they just assume that the reason is perhaps that 
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the values of put options can offset the value of call options. This reason seems to be 
opposite to the theoretical and empirical evidence documented in the literature (Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), Abel et al. (1996), and Berger et al. (1996)). When the value of put 
options increases, firms have more opportunities to sell capital assets at lower costs (Abel 
et al. (1996)). Moreover, because a firm’s abandonment option is considered as a put 
option, Berger et al. (1996) find that firm value increases in exit value. As a result, “the 
put option increases the incentive to invest” more in capital (Abel et al. (1996)), and thus 
reduces R&D investments to maximize a firm value. 
I, on the other hand, reexamine the effects of firm’s uncertainty on its R&D investments 
and go a step further to examine these effects on corporate investment dynamics. Further, 
literature on strategic growth option suggests that firms may invest in growth options 
when uncertainty is high. Moreover, while capital investments exercise or “kill” option to 
invest (Pindyck (1991)), R&D investments tend to generate growth options and will 
reduce firms’ specific risk in future. Thus, using idiosyncratic volatility to proxy for 
uncertainty, I come up with the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms tend to invest more in R&D when their idiosyncratic volatility is 
high because of the incentives to maintain and enhance their competitive advantage, all 
things equal. 
Although firms have a high value in the options to wait when uncertainty is high, this 
value easily erodes due to potential competitors. This value deteriorates more for less 
innovative firms or firms in more competitive industries. Further, when idiosyncratic 
volatility is high, these firms become riskier and incentives to maintain their competitive 
advantage will increase. Therefore, I hypothesize:  
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Hypothesis 2: Less innovative firms and firms with less growth opportunities tend invest 
more in R&D but less in capital when their idiosyncratic volatility is high, all things 
equal. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms in more competitive industries tend to invest more in R&D when 
their idiosyncratic volatility is high, all things equal. 
Because endogeneity problems may affect any conclusion on the relationship between 
uncertainty and corporate investment policies, I use different econometric methods as 
well as considering alternative measures to proxy for Tobin’s Q. The results will be 
shown in next sections. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Measurement 
I estimate the total volatility by calculating the annualized standard deviation of a firm’s 
daily stock returns in a year. I then decompose the firm’s total volatility into systematic 
and idiosyncratic volatilities as follows: 
Ri,t = αi + βiRM,t + εi,t   
where Ri,t is the stock returns of firm i at date t, RM,t is the market returns at date t. My 
measure of idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residuals εi,t  over a year. 
This measure is widely used to proxy for uncertainty in the literature on the effects of 
uncertainty on corporate investments (e.g. Leahy and Whited (1996), Bulan (2005), and 
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)). Because stock returns can reflect all firm’s activities, 
this measure can capture the total uncertainty (Bulan (2005)). This measure also reflects 
the volatility of firm’s profits and output price (Pindyck (1991)). Berk et al. (1999) and 
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Carlson et al. (2004), on the other hand, document that stock returns’ volatility can reflect 
a firm’s value of both assets in place and growth opportunities. Moreover, idiosyncratic 
volatility also reveals technological revolution (Pastor and Veronesi (2006, and 2009)). 
Thus, this measure is a good proxy for uncertainty that is relevant for firms’ investment 
decisions. 
An important issue in using idiosyncratic volatility is that this measure is highly 
persistent. Thus, I estimate it using non-overlapping window. This estimation is 
reasonable because corporate investments are often observed annually. 
2.3.2 Specification 
The goal of this essay is to examine the effects of firm uncertainty on corporate R&D 
investments. The orthodox theory of investment developed by Tobin (1969) compares the 
capitalized marginal investment to its purchase cost. If the ownership of investment is 
traded in the market, the capitalized value can be observed directly. Otherwise, this value 
is the expected value of the profits it will yield in future. Tobin (1969) uses the ratio of 
this value to the purchase price, called Tobin’s Q, to govern the investment decisions. 
Thus, Tobin’s Q should be controlled when I examine the effects of idiosyncratic 
volatility on corporate investment decisions. 
Because replacement cost is not observed directly, I follow Salinger and Summers (1993) 
to estimate the replacement cost of capital. I then define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s 
total market value to its replacement costs of capital. As shown in Salinger and Summers 
(1993), Tobin’s Q almost reflects a firm’s property plant and equipment. Thus, it is 
largely right skewed. To normalize this measure, I take the logarithm of this value. 
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Because both idiosyncratic volatility and corporate investments are affected by a firm’s 
cash flows, size and leverage, these factors need to be controlled. 
I follow Leahy and Whited (1996), Bulan (2005), and Panousi and Papaniolaou (2012) to 
investigate the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on corporate investment decisions by 
estimating the following regression: 
Invi,t =γ0 +βvoli,t-1 +β1logQi,t-1 + β2 logki,t-1 + β3cfkli,t-1 + β4 beai,t-1 + β5 yreti,t-1  +ηi 
+gt +ei,t (1) 
where Invi,t are capital investments (capital expenditures of firm i in year t/replacement 
costs of firm i in year t-1), R&D investments (R&D expenditures of firm i in year 
t/replacement costs of firm i in year t-1) or R&D investments/capital investments (R&D 
expenditures of firm i in year t / capital expenditures of firm i in year t). Qi,t-1 is Tobin-Q 
defined as the ratio of a firm’s market value to the replacement costs of capital in year t-
1, logki,t-1 is log of a firm’s replacement costs of capital to the average replacement costs 
of capital of all firms in the same industries in year t-1, cfkli,t-1  is the ratio of cash flow to 
cost of capital  in year t-1(operating income in year t-1/replacement costs in year t-2), 
beai,t-1 is the book equity ratio of firm i in year t-1, and yreti,t-1  is yearly stock returns of 
firm i in year t-1. ηi is firm dummies and gt  is time dummies. 
Due to an endogeneity problem in the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
corporate investments, I consider different methods to examine the effects of uncertainty 
on corporate investment decisions. Roberts and Whited (2012) document three main 
sources of endogeneity-simultaneity, omitted variables and errors in measurement. In this 
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paper, I consider these problems when investigating the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risk and corporate investments. 
Simultaneous equation systems (SE): 
First, I consider the simultaneous equation estimation. As shown in previous sections, 
idiosyncratic volatility can affect corporate investments, and the change in corporate 
investment policies also results in change in future idiosyncratic volatility. I modify 
equation (1) by adding another regression model of a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on 
investment ratios and other firm’s characteristics (2b). In this equation, I control for both 
capital and R&D investments. In detail, I estimate the effects of idiosyncratic volatility 
on corporate investment decisions by considering the following equation systems:  
Invi,t =γ0 +βvoli,t-1 +β1Qi,t-1 + β2 logki,t-1 + β3cfkli,t-1 + β4 beai,t-1 + β5 yreti,t-1  +ηi +gt 
+ei,t (2a) 
voli,t-1 =γ0 +β1Qi,t-1 + β2 logki,t-1 + β3cfkli,t-1 + β4 beai,t-1 + β5 yreti,t-1 + βInvi,t 
+γvolmt-1+ηi +gt +ei,t (2b) 
Instrumental variables (IV): 
Second, because I do not have general measures of uncertainty and of investment 
opportunities, I can use instrumental variables to reduce the effects of latent variables on 
the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and corporate investments. I use two external 
variables: the aggregate capital investment ratio and stock market return volatility to 
instrument for a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility.  
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voli,t-1 = γ0 +γ1ainvt-1 +γ2volmt-1  +β1Qi,t-1 + β2 logki,t-1 + β3cfkli,t-1 + β4 beai,t-1 + β5 
yreti,t-1  +ηi +gt +ei,(3a)  
Invi,t =γ0 +βvoli,t-1 +β1Qi,t-1 + β2 logki,t-1 + β3cfkli,t-1 + β4 beai,t-1 + β5 yreti,t-1  +ηi +gt 
+ei,t (3b) 
I measure the R&D investment ratio as a firm’s R&D expenditures to its replacement cost 
of capital. However, some recent studies use the ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditures to its 
total assets or sales (e.g. Chan et al. (2001), Kothari et al. (2002), and Eberhart et al. 
(2008)). Thus, I robustly check the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on corporate 
investment decisions by using different measures of R&D investments. 
2.4 Data, Measures and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Data and Measures 
I collect stock returns, prices, and number of shares outstanding from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily tapes for all ordinary common stocks (share 
code of 10 and 11) from 1980 to 2010. I use firms’ daily stock returns to estimate a firm’s 
total volatilities and its idiosyncratic volatility. I compute the yearly returns by 
calculating geometric average of stock returns during a year.  
I use COMPUSTAT files to calculate capital investment ratio, R&D investment ratio, the 
replacement cost of capital, Tobin’s Q, operating cash flow ratio, and the ratio of book 
equity to total assets from 1980 to 2010. I use the price deflator for non-residential fixed 
investment from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to estimate a firm’s 
replacement cost of capital. I define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s market 
capitalization at the end of December plus book value of long term debt and of preferred 
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stock, minus inventories to its replacement cost of capital. I compute operating cash flow 
ratio as the ratio of a firm’s operating income to its replacement cost of capital. These 
variables are discussed in table 18. 
Table 18: Variable Definition and Calculation 
Variable Definition and Calculation 
Vol i,t-1 idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns of firm i in year t-1 
Investi,t capital investments (capital expenditures of firm i at time t/replacement costs of 
firm i in year t-1) 
rdini,t R&D investments (R&D expenditures of firm i at time t/replacement costs of 
firm i in year t-1) 
Rd/(cap+rd)i,t R&D investments/total investments (R&D expenditures of firm i at time t / both 
capital and R&D expenditures of firm in year t) 
Logki,t-1 log of a firm’s replacement costs of capital to the average replacement costs of 
capital of all firms in the same industries in year t-1. I follow the methodology 
of Salinger and Summers (1983) and use the perpetual inventory method to 
compute the replacement value of the capital stock. I initialize the first value of 
capital stock (K0) as gross PPE. I then construct the capital stock iteratively as 
Kt  = ((Pt/Pt-1)* Kt-1 + It)(1-δj), where P is the price deflator for fixed 
nonresidential investment from National Income and Product Accounts, I is 
capital expenditure, and δj is book depreciation rate at the three-digit SIC level. I 
calculate δj = 2/Lj, where Lj is the useful life of capital good, computed as 




         
  
   . 
Qi,t-1 Tobin-Q defined as the ratio of a firm’s market value to the replacement costs of 
capital in year t-1. The firm’s market value is the market value of equity, plus 
book value of debt, plus book value of preferred stock and minus inventories. 
Cfkli,t-1 the ratio of operating income to cost of capital  in year t-1 (operating income at 
time t-1/replacement costs in year t-2) 
Bea i,t-1 the book equity ratio of firm i in year t-1 
yreti,t-1 yearly stock returns of firm i in fiscal year t-1 




Following Pastor and Veronesi (2003), I exclude any observation with market to book 
less than 0.01 or greater than 100. I eliminate any observation with total assets and 
market capitalization and book value less than $1 million, or any observation with return 
on equity greater than 100 or less than -100. Financial, utility and other regulated 
companies are also excluded from my sample
19
. Further, any observation without 
replacement cost of capital or with replacement cost of capital of zero are also eliminated 
from the sample. My final sample consists of 78,126 firm-year observations. 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of sample firms. Because I investigate corporate 
investment policies under uncertainty, I focus on two types of investments- capital 
investments and R&D expenditures. As shown in table 19, the average of a firm’s capital 
expenditure is 0.286 and its median is 0.202. On the other hand, the average of a firm’s 
R&D expenditures to its replacement cost of capital is 0.357 while this value at 75
th
 
percentile is 0.279. This evidence shows that R&D investments are clustered in some 
groups of firms.  As documented in literature (e.g. Chan et al. (2001), and Eberhart et al. 
(2004)), R&D expenditures almost belong to firms in high –tech industries
20
. Therefore I 




 percentiles to reduce 
outliers.   
I calculated Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market value of a firm to its physical replacement 
costs. Because physical replacement costs are basically the costs to replace physical 
assets (e.g. property, plant, and equipment), these costs are low for firms with high R&D 
investments. As a result, Tobin’s Q is high for these firms. Thus, to reduce right 
                                                          
19
 The industries are taken from Barclay and Smith (1995) 
20
 Industries defined in section  
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skewness toward firms with high R&D, I use the log form of this variable. As shown in 
table 19, the mean of Tobin’s Q for firms in my sample is 1.403, while its median is 
1.311. 
Table 19: Firms’ Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl N 
LAT 5.079 4.952 3.570 4.952 6.475       78,126  
lsize 5.004 4.879 3.421 4.879 6.468       78,126  
MB 2.727 1.753 1.079 1.753 2.987       78,126  
invest 0.286 0.202 0.108 0.202 0.353       78,126  
rdin 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.279       78,126  
vol 0.035 0.029 0.020 0.029 0.043       78,126  
Q 12.430 3.710 1.482 3.710 10.302       78,126  
logq 1.403 1.311 0.394 1.311 2.332       78,126  
Logk -2.524 -2.653 -4.157 -2.653 -1.018       78,126  
cfkl 0.002 0.129 -0.020 0.129 0.405       78,126  
bea 0.538 0.532 0.385 0.532 0.701       78,126  
yret 0.198 0.060 -0.219 0.060 0.389       78,126  
age 16.62 12 6 12 22       78,126  
 
Notes: This table shows the characteristics of all firms in my sample during the period of time from 1980 to 
2011. LAT is the log of total assets, Lsize is the log of firm’s market capitalization, MB is the ratio of 
firm’s size to its book equity, Invest is a firm’s capital investments to its replacement costs, rdin is a firm’s 
R&D investment to its replacement costs, and vol is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. Q is Tobin’s Q, logq is 
log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of capital, bea is the book equity ratio, and 
yret is yearly stock returns. Age is firm age. 
 
The results in table 19 show that the average stock return idiosyncratic volatility is 0.035 
and its median is 0.029.  The average of firms’ log total assets in my sample is 5.079 
while the median is 4.952. The average of log size captured by market capitalization is 
5.004. The average book equity to total assets is 0.538 while its median is 0.532. 
2.5 Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Policies 
Recent literature (e.g. Pindyck 1991, Dixit Pindyck (1994), and Panousi and 
Papanikolaou, (2012)) widely documents the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on capital 
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investments; however, these effects on R&D investments or corporate investment 
policies are relatively unexplored. In this section, I will investigate the changes in a 
firm’s investment policies under uncertainty. I focus on two important types of corporate 
investments- capital and R&D. First, I examine the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on a 
firm’s R&D investment proportion to its total investments. Second, I study these effects 
on a firm’s capital and R&D investments.  
As shown in the previous section, this idiosyncratic volatility measure may be 
endogenous with corporate investments. I use three different econometric methods to 
estimate the effects of a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on its investment policies: fixed 
effects, simultaneous equation estimation and instrumental variables. Because my 
purpose is to examine the effects of a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on its investment 
policies, I mainly focus on the main results from the simultaneous equation estimation 
(model 2a). 
Table 20 shows the results from the regressions of a firm’s R&D investment proportion 
to total investments on its idiosyncratic volatility and other firm’s characteristics. 
Consistent with my first hypothesis, the results from three models show that a firm’s 
idiosyncratic volatility is significantly positively correlated with R&D investment 
proportion. The-statistics of these coefficients are greater than 3.6. Similarly, the change 
in firm idiosyncratic volatility is also positively correlated with the ration of R&D 
investments to total corporate investments. Consistent with my hypothesis, these results 
show that when a firm’s uncertainty increases, it tends to invest more in R&D than in 




Table 20: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility and Corporate Investments 
 
Model (1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2a) (2b) (3) 
  Rd/(cap+rd)i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Vol i,t-1 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Cvol i,t-1 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t 
        
Vol i,t-1 0.187***  4.546***    2.517*** 
 (3.68)  (74.47)    (6.61) 
Cvol i,t-1  0.101***   1.143***   
  (3.02)   (15.43)   
Logqi,t-1 -0.013*** -0.014*** 0.085*** -0.005*** 0.069*** -0.001*** 0.078*** 
 (-9.08) (-9.74) (89.55) (-77.59) (74.17) (-15.97) (30.40) 
Logki,t-1 -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.005*** -0.005*** -0.020*** -0.000*** -0.006** 
 (-3.63) (-3.96) (8.17) (-171.87) (-37.35) (-11.92) (-2.41) 
cfkli,t-1 -0.001** -0.001** -0.005*** -0.000*** -0.006*** -0.000*** -0.006*** 
 (-2.27) (-2.31) (-19.50) (-18.45) (-25.98) (-5.56) (-3.80) 
bea i,t-1 -0.013* -0.014** 0.297*** -0.011*** 0.266*** -0.003*** 0.285*** 
 (-1.78) (-2.00) (52.43) (-34.60) (46.66) (-10.03) (19.12) 
yret i,t-1 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.037*** 0.003*** -0.025*** -0.000*** -0.033*** 
 (-8.09) (-7.66) (-28.34) (38.41) (-19.62) (-4.18) (-16.54) 
_cons 0.219*** 0.224*** -0.104*** 0.011*** -0.027*** -0.011*** -0.088*** 
 (22.08) (23.00) (-15.22) (22.54) (-3.96) (-26.33) (-6.45) 
Method F, T, OLS F, T, OLS SE SE SE SE IV, 2SLS 
N 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 
R
2
 0.0110 0.0071 0.2214 0.3886 0.2203 0.0961 0.2287 
 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression models 1, 2, and 3. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1. Cvol i,t-1 is the change 
in idiosyncratic volatility for firm i from year t-2 to t-1. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of capital, bea is the book 
equity ratio, and yret is yearly stock returns. F denotes firm fixed effects, T denotes time fixed effects, SE denotes simultaneous equation method, and 
IV denotes instrumental variables. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates 




While the effects of a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on its R&D investment proportion 
are consistent among the three models, the effects of some other firm’s characteristics are 
inconsistent among these models. The results from the fixed effect method show that 
Tobin’s Q (in the log form) is negatively related to its R&D investment proportion, while 
this relation is positive in other models. While the results from simultaneous equation 
estimation show the positive relation between the physical replacement costs and the 
R&D proportion, this relation is negative in fixed effect model and instrumental variable 
estimation. Similarly, while the ratio of book equity on total assets is insignificantly 
correlated with R&D investment proportion in the fixed effect model, but it is 
significantly positively related to R&D investment proportion in other regression 
specifications.  
In contrast, all three models show that a firm’s profitability and stock returns are 
significantly negatively correlated with its R&D investment proportion. These results 
imply that firms with high profitability and have good performance tend to invest more in 
capital expenditures rather than in R&D.  
To further examine the effects of a firm’s uncertainty on its corporate investment 
policies, I estimate regressions of capital and R&D investments on a firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility and other characteristics. Current literature widely documents the negative 
relation between a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and its capital investments. Real option 
theory documents that capital investments are irreversible and costly and that uncertainty 
will generate options to wait. Thus, firms will delay these investments when their 
uncertainty is high to maximize their value (e.g. Pindyck (1991), Dixit Pindyck (1994)). 
The negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and capital investments can also be 
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explained by managerial risk aversion behaviors (Panousi and Papanikolaou, (2012)). 
Because top executives are risk averse due to the inability to short their company’s 
shares, they will invest less when a firm’s idiosyncratic risk is high. 
Consistent with these theories, the results in table 21 show that firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility is significantly negatively related to capital investments. The t-statistic of this 
coefficient in both models is less than -13. Further, these results document that firms with 
high Tobin’s Q, high profitability, and good performance tend to invest more while firms 
with high replacement costs will invest less in capital expenditures.  
This result is also consistent with my hypothesis that incentives to maintain and enhance 
a firm’s competitive advantage mainly drive its investment policies. As analyzed in the 
previous section, idiosyncratic volatility will generate options to wait. If this value is 
higher than the benefits of capital investments, a firm should delay these investments to 
optimize its total value and enhance its competitive advantage. 
In contrast with the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and capital 
investments, firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is significantly positively correlated with 
firm’s R&D investments. Because R&D investments are risky, this positive relation is 
inconsistent with the managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Moreover, R&D investments 
are even more irreversible and costly (Li, 2011), and the literature on real options, which 
focuses on the costs of irreversible and the value of options to wait, does not seem to 
explain the relation between firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and its R&D investments. 
However, the value of the option to wait is easily eroded because of potential competitors 
or an increase in cost of capital. In this case, firms may not get high value from high 
idiosyncratic volatility if they do not maintain or generate growth opportunities. Thus, 
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under competition environment, the effects of idiosyncratic volatility on R&D 
investments become ambiguous. 
Using the strategic growth option framework, I hypothesize that the positive relation 
between firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and its R&D investments is caused by the 
incentives to maintain and enhance its competitive advantage. As documented in the 
literature, R&D investments usually result in a new technological progress and will 
increase the productivity of physical investment (Lin (2012)). Because the outcomes of 
R&D investments are difficult to imitate (Lengnick-Hall 1992), these investments are 
considered as the cornerstones of their competitive advantages (Porter and Millar (1985), 
Barney (1991), and Lengnick-Hall (1992)). Eberhart et al. (2004) empirically find that 
firms with substantial increase in R&D expenditures will outperform in future. Similarly, 
Pindyck (1991) documents that R&D investments with generate more growth 
opportunities and then enhance firms’ competitive advantages. 
The results in table 21 are consistent with my hypothesis. Firms with low profitability 
and with low stock returns tend to invest more in R&D. T-statistics of coefficients in both 
the estimation methods are less than -4. Moreover, the equity ratio is significantly and 
positively related with R&D investments, while this ratio is negatively correlated with 
capital investments. Similarly, while firms with good performance (high profitability or 
high stock returns) last year tend to make more capital investments, they will invest less 
in R&D. Because the effects of these firm’s characteristics on R&D are opposite to these 
effects on capital investments, it implies that R&D investments are different from capital 




Table 21: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility and Capital and R&D Investments 
Model (2a) (2a) (3a) (2a) (2a) (3a) 
  Investi,t Investi,t Investi,t rdini,t rdini,t rdini,t 
       
Vol i,t-1 -0.870***  -3.463*** 7.715***  6.809*** 
 (-16.37)  (-13.42) (54.05)  (8.33) 
Cvol i,t-1  -0.872***   0.854***  
  (-13.77)   (4.98)  
Logqi,t-1 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.076*** 0.275*** 0.247*** 0.271*** 
 (108.60) (114.78) (51.48) (123.95) (113.86) (34.32) 
Logki,t-1 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.020*** 0.000 -0.044*** -0.004 
 (-7.55) (0.96) (-12.37) (0.14) (-34.49) (-0.86) 
cfkli,t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 (14.46) (15.71) (3.77) (-42.46) (-47.41) (-4.50) 
bea i,t-1 -0.005 -0.001 -0.030*** 0.474*** 0.419*** 0.473*** 
 (-1.10) (-0.18) (-3.45) (35.85) (31.59) (15.96) 
yret i,t-1 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.040*** -0.045*** -0.027*** -0.045*** 
 (29.58) (27.46) (19.30) (-15.04) (-9.00) (-9.15) 
_cons 0.206*** 0.191*** 0.256*** -0.405*** -0.276*** -0.515*** 
 (34.93) (32.64) (29.94) (-25.42) (-17.46) (-17.73) 
Method SE SE IV, 2SLS SE SE IV, 2SLS 
N 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 
R
2
 0.2251 0.2251 0.1659 0.3034 0.3031 0.3021 
 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression models 2 and 3. Investi,t is the capital investment ratio which is the value of capital 
expenditures to replacement costs. rdini,t is the ratio of R&D investments to replacement costs. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1.  
Cvol i,t-1 is the change in idiosyncratic volatility for firm i from year t-2 to t-1. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of 
capital, bea is the book equity ratio, and yret is yearly stock returns. SE denotes simultaneous equation method, and IV denotes instrumental variables. 




2.6 Uncertainty, Investment Policies and Firm’s Characteristics 
Section 2.5 documents that firms tend to invest more in R&D when their idiosyncratic 
volatility is high because they want to maintain and enhance their competitive 
advantages. In this section, I further examine the effects of firm’s characteristics on the 
relation between a firm’s uncertainty and its investment policies. 
If the incentives to maintain and enhance a firm’s competitive advantage are the main 
driver of the positive relationship between uncertainty and its R&D investments, I should 
expect that this relationship is more pronounced for firms with higher incentives. Because 
less innovative firms or firms with low growth opportunities tend to have higher 
incentives to maintain their competitive advantages, I expect that the effects of 
idiosyncratic volatility on R&D investments will be high for these firms.  
Following Chan et al. (2001), Eberhart et al. (2004) and Eberhart et al. (2008), I use the 
ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets or total sales (not reported) to capture a firm’s 
innovative level. The higher this ratio is, the more innovative a firm is.  
Because Q-theory of investments states that firms with high Tobin’ Q will invest more 
and this measure also can be used to capture a firm’s growth opportunities (e.g. Cao et al. 
(2008)), I use market–to–book ratio to proxy for growth opportunities to avoid 
unnecessary misunderstanding. This variable is widely used in the literature (e.g. Cao et 
al. (2008)). I also use R&D investments to total assets to capture innovation and book 
equity to total assets to capture a firm’s capital structure.  
Another firm’s characteristic widely used to study the relation between firm’s 
characteristics and innovation is firm’s size. Although large firms have high absolute 
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values of R&D investments and patents, they have lower innovation scaled by size (Seru 
(2010), and Phillips and Zhdanov (2012)). Thus, they are less innovative than small ones. 
As a result, I expect that they will invest more in R&D and less in capital expenditures 
when their idiosyncratic volatilities are high. 
Table 22 presents the results from the regression models of R&D investment proportion 
to total corporate investments on these firm’s characteristics and other firm 
characteristics. These results show that less innovative firms tend to invest more in R&D 
when their specific risk is high. Firms with less growth opportunities captured by market-
to-book ratio also tend to invest more in R&D. Consistent with my hypothesis, large 
firms or less innovative firms tend to invest more in R&D when their idiosyncratic 
volatility is high. The absolute values of t-statistics of these coefficients are greater than 
11. Table 22 also shows that the relation between firm’s uncertainty and its R&D 
investment proportion is more pronounced for firms with high equity financing. 
Because the change in R&D investment proportion can result from the change in R&D or 
in capital expenditure or both, I examine the effects of these firm’s characteristics on the 
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and capital and R&D investments. These results 
are shown in tables 23 and 24. 
Table 23 presents the effects of these firm’s characteristics on the relation between firm’s 
idiosyncratic volatility and capital investments. The results in this table show that firms 
with high R&D investment ratio or firms with high equity financing tend to invest less, 
while large firms tend to invest more in capital expenditure when they face high 
idiosyncratic volatility. However, these firm’s characteristics do not affect the relation 
between firm idiosyncratic volatility and the change in capital investments.  
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Table 22: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, Corporate Investments, and Firm’s Characteristics 
 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t 
        
Voli,t-1 4.272*** 2.591*** 3.623*** 2.399*** 2.028*** 4.514** 2.089*** 
 (63.23) (5.58) (69.66) (6.81) (15.33) (2.45) (21.68) 
Vol*MB i,t-1 -0.107*** -0.016      
 (-10.50) (-0.42)      
MB i,t-1 0.009*** 0.005***      
 (16.77) (2.99)      
Vol*RDATi,t-1   -25.576*** -23.294***    
   (-76.12) (-10.92)    
RDATi,t-1   3.331*** 3.236***    
   (160.29) (22.97)    
Vol*bea i,t-1     0.918*** -3.026  
     (4.38) (-1.11)  
Vol*lsizei,t-1       0.408*** 
       (15.27) 
lsizei,t-1       0.109*** 
       (41.16) 
Logqi,t-1 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.078*** 0.079*** -0.031*** 
 (73.99) (27.20) (61.20) (20.49) (81.50) (28.81) (-12.04) 
Logki,t-1 0.002*** -0.006** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.116*** 
 (2.94) (-2.36) (10.37) (-0.46) (-10.14) (-1.00) (-45.86) 
cfkli,t-1 -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (-19.87) (-3.78) (6.54) (1.97) (-22.41) (-3.82) (-22.03) 
bea i,t-1 0.311*** 0.303*** 0.177*** 0.172*** 0.247*** 0.404*** 0.178*** 
 (53.94) (19.94) (39.29) (14.63) (24.96) (3.67) (29.65) 
yret i,t-1 -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.040*** 
 (-27.84) (-18.38) (-19.21) (-12.31) (-24.88) (-17.11) (-30.87) 
Method SE SE SE SE SE SE SE 
N 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 77,670 
R
2
 0.2278 0.2309 0.5159 0.5175 0.2349 0.2227 0.2566 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression model 2. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1. Rd/(cap+rd) i,t is the ratio of 
R&D investments to total investments. MB is the ratio of firm’s size to its book equity, RDAT is the ratio of R&D investments to total assets, bea is the 
ratio of firm’s equity to total assets, and lsize is log of a firm’s market capitalization. Other control variables are defined in appendix. The standard 




Table 23: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, Firm’s Characteristics, and Capital Expenditures 
 investi,t cinvesti,t investi,t cinvesti,t investi,t cinvesti,t investi,t cinvesti,t 
         
Voli,t-1 -0.390*** -0.260 -0.173*** 0.083 -0.351*** -0.675** -3.015*** 0.105 
 (-6.64) (-1.58) (-3.03) (0.52) (-3.08) (-2.11) (-35.96) (0.44) 
Vol*MB i,t-1 -0.065*** 0.002       
 (-7.36) (0.08)       
MB i,t-1 0.001*** -0.003**       
 (2.95) (-2.49)       
Vol*RDATi,t-1   -2.412*** 0.420     
   (-6.55) (0.40)     
RDATi,t-1   -0.131*** -0.357***     
   (-5.75) (-5.56)     
Vol*bea i,t-1     -0.930*** 0.493   
     (-5.15) (0.97)   
Vol*lsizei,t-1       0.759*** -0.092 
       (32.57) (-1.40) 
lsizei,t-1       0.014*** 0.009 
       (5.83) (1.38) 
Logqi,t-1 0.092*** 0.069*** 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.090*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 
 (102.80) (27.55) (112.91) (29.98) (108.75) (27.83) (25.70) (9.51) 
Logki,t-1 -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.002*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.033*** -0.018*** 
 (-4.72) (-7.61) (-3.78) (-7.42) (-6.86) (-8.17) (-15.14) (-2.90) 
cfkli,t-1 0.003*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.000 0.003*** -0.000 
 (14.25) (-0.30) (11.02) (-1.74) (14.25) (-0.06) (16.14) (-0.06) 
bea i,t-1 -0.009* -0.063*** 0.009* -0.033** 0.031*** -0.071*** -0.044*** -0.055*** 
 (-1.73) (-4.52) (1.85) (-2.36) (3.59) (-2.95) (-8.28) (-3.68) 
yret i,t-1 0.035*** 0.061*** 0.031*** 0.056*** 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.026*** 0.059*** 
 (30.37) (19.09) (27.56) (17.94) (29.71) (18.82) (23.20) (18.53) 
N 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 
R
2
 0.2269 0.0280 0.2326 0.0294 0.2254 0.0278 0.2281 0.0278 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression model 2. Voli,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1. Investi,t is the capital investment 
ratio which is the value of capital expenditures to replacement costs. cinvesti,t is the change in capital investment to replacement costs at the previous 
year. MB is the ratio of firm’s size to its book equity, RDAT is the ratio of R&D investments to total assets, bea is the ratio of firm’s equity to total 
assets, and lsize is log of a firm’s market capitalization. Other control variables are defined in appendix (not reported here). The standard errors are 





Table 24: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, Firm’s Characteristics, and R&D Investments 
 
 
 rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t 
         
Voli,t-1 6.510*** 0.690*** 4.548*** 3.072*** -0.581* -0.790 -3.410*** -2.427*** 
 (41.24) (2.64) (36.61) (12.07) (-1.89) (-1.56) (-15.14) (-6.47) 
Vol*MB i,t-1 -0.046* 0.002       
 (-1.95) (0.05)       
MB i,t-1 0.013*** 0.005**       
 (9.76) (2.33)       
Vol*RDATi,t-1   -44.364*** -16.698***     
   (-55.15) (-10.15)     
RDATi,t-1   6.923*** 0.449***     
   (139.13) (4.41)     
Vol*bea i,t-1     7.944*** 2.155***   
     (16.34) (2.68)   
Vol*lsizei,t-1       2.532*** 0.868*** 
       (40.46) (8.33) 
lsizei,t-1       0.035*** -0.027** 
       (5.63) (-2.57) 
Logqi,t-1 0.256*** 0.056*** 0.188*** 0.072*** 0.259*** 0.061*** 0.162*** 0.061*** 
 (106.49) (14.05) (102.80) (19.19) (116.86) (16.62) (27.14) (6.20) 
Logki,t-1 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.003** 0.008*** -0.025*** -0.002 -0.110*** 0.004 
 (-4.87) (0.30) (-2.45) (3.39) (-16.51) (-0.72) (-18.62) (0.40) 
cfkli,t-1 -0.024*** 0.017*** -0.010*** 0.016*** -0.025*** 0.017*** -0.025*** 0.017*** 
 (-42.42) (18.07) (-22.22) (16.52) (-44.40) (17.81) (-43.29) (18.06) 
         
         
         
         
         
93 
 
         
         
         
Table 24: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, Firm’s Characteristics, and R&D Investments (continued) 
 
 
 rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t rdin i,t crd i,t 
         
         
bea i,t-1 0.506*** 0.124*** 0.201*** 0.125*** 0.138*** 0.019 0.326*** 0.093*** 
 (37.57) (5.58) (18.73) (5.71) (5.98) (0.49) (23.06) (3.93) 
yret i,t-1 -0.049*** 0.028*** -0.007*** 0.028*** -0.038*** 0.032*** -0.059*** 0.027*** 
 (-16.00) (5.55) (-3.03) (5.60) (-12.54) (6.49) (-19.28) (5.32) 
_cons -0.423*** -0.094*** -0.287*** -0.131*** -0.180*** -0.029 -0.645*** 0.043 
 (-26.03) (-3.50) (-22.24) (-4.97) (-9.60) (-0.93) (-17.01) (0.68) 
         
N 78126 78126 78126 78126 78126 78126 78126 78126 
R
2
 0.3088 0.0134 0.5494 0.0146 0.3117 0.0132 0.3213 0.0135 
 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression model 2. Voli,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1. rdini,t is the ratio of R&D 
investments to replacement costs. crd i,t is the change in R&D investments to replacement costs at the previous year. MB is the ratio of firm’s size to its 
book equity, RDAT is the ratio of R&D investments to total assets, bea is the ratio of firm’s equity to total assets, and lsize is log of a firm’s market 
capitalization. Other control variables are defined in the appendix. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) two-tailed level. 
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In contrast to the effect of firm characteristics on the relation between uncertainty and the 
change in capital investments, the effects of these firm characteristics on the relation 
between firm’s uncertainty and R&D investment policies are more pronounced and 
significant. As shown in table 24, less innovative firms or firms with high equity 
financing will invest more in R&D than other firms when their uncertainty is high. The t-
statistic of the coefficient of the interaction of R&D investments and firm idiosyncratic 
volatility is -10.15, while the t-statistic of the coefficient of the interaction of equity 
financing and uncertainty is 2.68. This implies that these firms increase their R&D 
investments if their uncertainty increases. Similarly, large firms tend to invest more in 
R&D when they face high uncertainty. The t-statistic of the coefficient of the interaction 
of firm size and idiosyncratic volatility is 8.33. These results show that the incentives to 
maintain and enhance a firm’s competitive advantages are important forces for corporate 
investment policies under uncertainty.  
2.7 Uncertainty, Investment Policies and Industries 
An additional way of examining whether the positive relation between uncertainty and 
R&D investments is caused by the incentives to maintain and enhance a firm’s 
competitive advantage is to compare this relation among firms in different industries with 
different levels of innovation or of competition. In this section, I compare the effects of 
idiosyncratic volatility on corporate investments for firms in high tech with firms in non-
high tech industries and for firms in more competitive with firms in less competitive 
industries. I expect that these effects are more pronounced for firms in non-high tech 
industries and for firms in more competitive industries. 
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2.7.1 High-tech Industries 
I follow Fama and French (1997) to define high tech industries as industries with the 
following four-digit SIC codes from 3570 to 3579, 3600 to 3629, 3640 to 3646, 3648 to 
3649, 3660 to 3692, 3695 to 3699, 4800 to 4899, 7370 to 7373 and 7375. Because firms 
in high tech industries invest much more in R&D than firms in non-high tech industries, 
the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and R&D investment proportion will be more 
pronounced for firms in high tech industries. Therefore, this section will focus on how 
firms change their corporate investment policies when their uncertainty is high. 
Table 25 shows the effects of firms in different industries on the relation between firms’ 
idiosyncratic volatility and their investment policies. As expected, R&D investment 
proportion will be high for the firms in high tech industries. Thus, firms’ idiosyncratic 
volatility should be significantly positively related to this ratio for these firms. In 
contrast, capital investments of these firms are usually less than those of the firms in non-
high tech industries. As a result, these firms’ idiosyncratic volatility is negatively 
correlated with capital investments. 
Because the corporate investment policies for these types of firms are different, I focus 
on the difference in the change in corporate investment decisions among the firms in 
different industry groups. Model 3 (column 3) shows that the negative relation between 
firm uncertainty and the change in its capital investments is more pronounced for the 
firms in high tech industries. This means that these firms will reduce capital expenditures 
more when their idiosyncratic volatilities are high than firms in non-high tech do. 
Interestingly, the results in model 5 (column 5) show that firms in non-high tech 
industries tend to increase their investments in R&D when their idiosyncratic volatility is 
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higher than firms in high tech industries. These results are consistent with my hypothesis 
that firms in less innovative industries tend to invest more in R&D when their uncertainty 
is high. 
Table 25: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, High-tech Industries, and Corporate Investments 
 
 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t invest i,t cinvest i,t rdin i,t crd i,t 
      
vol i,t-1 2.084*** -0.883*** 0.004 5.604*** 1.161*** 
 (33.77) (-15.48) (0.02) (36.92) (4.57) 
Vol*tech i,t-1 5.228*** 0.030 -0.931*** 4.875*** -0.406* 
 (98.62) (0.60) (-6.74) (37.25) (-1.85) 
logq i,t-1 0.072*** 0.089*** 0.067*** 0.264*** 0.064*** 
 (79.74) (107.48) (28.58) (118.66) (17.41) 
logk i,t-1 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.001 0.002 
 (4.36) (-7.57) (-7.93) (-0.85) (0.98) 
cfkl i,t-1 -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.024*** 0.017*** 
 (-21.29) (14.46) (-0.08) (-42.94) (17.95) 
bea i,t-1 0.254*** -0.006 -0.044*** 0.435*** 0.110*** 
 (47.41) (-1.14) (-3.20) (33.06) (5.02) 
yret i,t-1 -0.034*** 0.033*** 0.059*** -0.044*** 0.031*** 
 (-28.11) (29.59) (18.74) (-14.55) (6.26) 
      
N 77,670 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 
R
2
 0.3125 0.2251 0.0283 0.3160 0.0132 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model 2. Rd/(cap+rd) i,t is the ratio of R&D 
investments to total investments. Investi,t is the capital investment ratio which is the value of capital 
expenditures to replacement costs and cinvesti,t is the change in capital investment to replacement costs at 
the previous year. rdini,t is the ratio of R&D investments to replacement costs and crd i,t is the change in 
R&D investments to replacement costs at the previous year. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in 
year t-1. Tech is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm in high tech industries and 0 otherwise. 
logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of capital, bea is the book equity ratio, 
and yret is yearly stock returns. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) two-tailed level. 
 
2.7.2 Product Market Competition 
Another important way to test my hypothesis that the incentives to maintain a firm’s 
competitive advantage drive its investment policies under an uncertain environment is to 
examine the effects of market competition on the relationship between firms’ uncertainty 
and their investment policies. Because firms in more competitive industries have higher 
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pressure on their survivals when they face high specific risk, the effects of idiosyncratic 
volatility on R&D investment proportion should be more pronounced for these firms.  
I measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index, which is defined as 
            ∑   
 
 
   
 
where sij is the proportion of sales of firm i in industry j, and I is the number of firms in 
industry j. I calculated this variable each year for each industry using three-digit SIC 
codes, and then averaged these values over the prior three years. This method helps 
reduce some potential data errors (Hou (2006)). 
Because the HHI measure uses the entire distribution of industry sales information, it 
reflects the complete picture of industry concentration. A large value for this index 
implies that the market is concentrated by a small group of firms, while a small value 
implies that the market is shared by many competing firms.  
Some other common ways to measure the HHI are to use market capitalization or total 
assets to calculate market share. Because these measures are highly correlated with each 
other, I focus on HHI index calculated by sales. The results are consistent when I use this 
index measured by total assets or market capitalization. 
Table 26 reports the effects of industry competition on the relationship between firms’ 
idiosyncratic volatility and their investment decisions. As expected, firms in more 
concentrated industries tend to invest less in R&D than in capital expenditures. 
Moreover, when firm’s uncertainty increases, these firms invest less in R&D. In contrast, 
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these firms invest more in capital than firms in more competitive industries when firms’ 
idiosyncratic volatility is high.  
 
Table 26: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, Product Market Competition, and Corporate 
Investments 
 
 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t invest i,t cinvest i,t rdin i,t crd i,t 
      
vol i,t-1 5.048*** -1.243*** -0.557*** 8.687*** 1.223*** 
 (61.53) (-17.16) (-2.74) (45.14) (4.64) 
Vol*hhi i,t-1 -3.360*** 1.084*** 0.653 -6.783*** -1.003** 
 (-16.50) (6.05) (1.30) (-14.27) (-2.11) 
hhi i,t-1 -0.110*** -0.084*** -0.012 -0.264***  
 (-12.75) (-11.09) (-0.54) (-13.05)  
logq i,t-1 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.065*** 0.264*** 0.063*** 
 (84.88) (106.86) (27.85) (119.74) (17.07) 
logk i,t-1 0.004*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.002 0.002 
 (6.49) (-8.22) (-8.10) (-1.52) (0.94) 
cfkl i,t-1 -0.004*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.024*** 0.017*** 
 (-18.54) (14.43) (-0.15) (-41.85) (18.01) 
bea i,t-1 0.283*** -0.009* -0.051*** 0.443*** 0.105*** 
 (50.63) (-1.74) (-3.71) (33.88) (4.79) 
yret i,t-1 -0.035*** 0.034*** 0.059*** -0.043*** 0.031*** 
 (-27.85) (29.95) (18.84) (-14.41) (6.31) 
      
N 77,670 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 
R
2
 0.2466 0.2263 0.0278 0.3223 0.0132 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the results from the regression model 2. Rd/(cap+rd) i,t is the ratio of R&D 
investments to total investments. Investi,t is the capital investment ratio which is the value of capital 
expenditures to replacement costs and cinvesti,t is the change in capital investment to replacement costs at 
the previous year. rdini,t is the ratio of R&D investments to replacement costs and crd i,t is the change in 
R&D investments to replacement costs at the previous year. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in 
year t-1. HHI the Herfindahl index. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of 
capital, bea is the book equity ratio, and yret is yearly stock returns. The standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1%, (5%), 
(10%) two-tailed level. 
 
The results in table 26 support my hypothesis that firms in more competitive industries 
tend to invest more in R&D than firms in less competitive industries do. This implies that 
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the incentives to maintain a firm’s competitive advantage are important drivers of the 
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and corporate investment policies.  
2.8 R&D Investments and Firms’ Idiosyncratic Volatility in the Future 
The previous sections document that that firms prefer R&D investments when they face 
high uncertainty in their investment opportunities. In this section, I will focus on the 
benefits of R&D investments which can drive the relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and corporate investment decisions. 
As shown in the recent literature (e.g. Eberhart et al. (2004), Eberhart et al. (2008), and 
Lin (2012)), R&D investments will usually generate more growth opportunities and 
improve a firm’s productivity. Eberhart et al. (2004) find that firms experience 
significantly positive long term abnormal operating performance following an increase in 
their R&D investments. Moreover, Eberhart et al. (2008) document that R&D 
investments will benefit bondholders because the significant increase in operating 
performance more than offsets the increase in the firm’s default risk. In addition, Lin 
(2012) suggests that R&D investments will improve a firm’s productivity.  
This section will present another benefit of R&D investments. I document that an 
increase in R&D investments will reduce a firm’s uncertainty in the future. This evidence 
is also consistent with the benefits of R&D investments shown in the literature. In 
addition, it supports my hypothesis that firms that face high uncertainty tend to invest 
more in R&D to reduce specific risk and improve competitive advantage in the future.  
I sort all firms by year into three groups based on their R&D intensity captured by R&D 





 percentile while group 3 includes firms with R&D investments more than 
the 66
th
 percentile. The median R&D investments of firms in each group are shown in 
figure 3.  This figure shows that while firms with high R&D investments (group 3) have 
higher idiosyncratic volatilities than firms in the other groups, these volatilities tend to 
reduce over time after portfolio formation. This implies that R&D investments can reduce 
a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. This pattern is consistent when R&D intensity is 
measured by R&D investments to total assets or R&D to sales (not reported) as well as 
when firms without R&D are excluded.   
Figure 3: Firms’ Idiosyncratic Volatilities following Their R&D Investments 
 
Notes: This figure shows the median firm’s stock return idiosyncratic volatility following its R&D 
investments. Every year, I sort all firms into three groups based on their R&D intensity captured by R&D 
expenditures to replacement costs. Group 1 consists of firms with R&D investments less than 33
rd
 




Table 27 reports the results from the regression of changes in future idiosyncratic 
volatilities on changes in R&D investments and other firm’s characteristics. These results 
show that an increase in R&D (capital) investments will reduce (raise) a firm’s 
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in R&D investments are less than -2.70. These results suggest that firms with high 
uncertainty should invest more in R&D to improve their competitive advantage. 
Table 27: Change in R&D Investments and Future Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
 cvol i,(t+1)-t cvol i,(t+2)-t cvol i,(t+3)-t cvol i,(t+4)-t 
     
crdi,t -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (-6.30) (-7.15) (-5.53) (-2.74) 
cinvesti,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.89) (6.27) (9.98) (5.66) 
voli,t -0.319*** -0.418*** -0.507*** -0.575*** 
 (-107.87) (-105.63) (-107.90) (-110.23) 
logqi,t -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-26.40) (-19.07) (-17.41) (-16.58) 
logki,t -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-67.66) (-66.29) (-66.21) (-65.35) 
cfkli,t -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-15.69) (-13.83) (-11.89) (-9.77) 
be i,t -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (-22.20) (-19.32) (-16.17) (-13.39) 
yreti,t -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-35.66) (-25.36) (-15.40) (-13.08) 
_cons 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (16.62) (19.68) (20.77) (16.34) 
     
N 90,135 80,935 72226 64,405 
R
2
 0.1967 0.2239 0.2451 0.2723 
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of change in R&D investments on the change in a firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatilities in future. cvol i,(t+k)-t is the change in the idiosyncratic volatility of firm i from year t to year t+k. 
crd i,t is the change in R&D investments to replacement costs at the previous year and cinvesti,t is the change 
in capital investment to replacement costs at the previous year. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of 
operating income to cost of capital, bea is the book equity ratio, and yret is yearly stock returns. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** (**) (*) 
indicates significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) two-tailed level. 
 
2.9 Robustness Tests 
In previous sections, I measure the R&D investments by the ratio of a firm’s R&D 
expenditures to its replacement costs. However, the current literature (e.g. Chan et al. 
(2001), Eberhart et al. (2004), and Eberhart et al. (2008)) usually measures the R&D 
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investment ratio by the ratios of R&D to sales or R&D to assets. Moreover, Eberhart et 
al. (2008) suggest that these R&D intensity measures are better than the ratio of R&D to 
the market value of equity. Thus, in this section I will use these R&D investment 
measures and examine the effects of firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on these R&D 
measures.  
Another reason to use different measures of R&D investments is to avoid endogeneity 
problems in empirical corporate finance (Roberts and Whited (2012)). Because there are 
no perfect measure investment opportunities, potential endogeneity biases may lead to the 
wrong conclusion. Thus, using different measures of R&D investments helps me reduce 
bias when I estimate the regression model. 
Table 28: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility, and R&D Investments 
 
 rdat i,t rdsale i,t crdat i,t crdsale i,t 
     
vol i,t-1 1.597*** 52.582*** 0.008 9.783*** 
 (75.02) (6.56) (0.64) (3.30) 
logq i,t-1 0.023*** 0.628*** 0.004*** 0.105** 
 (70.70) (5.06) (20.47) (2.29) 
logk i,t-1 0.004*** 0.202** 0.001*** 0.048 
 (19.21) (2.41) (3.88) (1.55) 
cfkl i,t-1 -0.003*** -0.175*** 0.000*** -0.009 
 (-29.69) (-5.46) (7.54) (-0.74) 
bea i,t-1 0.071*** 2.563*** 0.014*** 0.657** 
 (35.83) (3.46) (11.61) (2.40) 
yret i,t-1 -0.004*** -0.246 0.005*** 0.020 
 (-8.03) (-1.46) (17.10) (0.31) 
_cons -0.049*** -2.193** -0.004*** -0.491 
 (-20.49) (-2.46) (-3.04) (-1.49) 
N 78,126 78,126 78,126 78,126 
R
2
 0.13220 0.0015 0.0200 0.0005 
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression model 2 using different measures to proxy for 
R&D investments. rdat i,t is the ratio of R&D investments to total assets and rdsale i,t is the ratio of R&D 
investments to total sales. crdat i,t is the change in R&D investment to total assets at the previous year and 
crdsale i,t is the change in R&D investments to total sales in previous year. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility in year t-1. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of capital, bea is 
the book equity ratio, and yret is yearly stock returns. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, 




Using the simultaneous equation estimation method, I investigate the effects of a firm’s 
idiosyncratic volatility on its R&D investments captured by the ratios of R&D to sales 
and to total assets. The results are shown in table 28. Consistent with the previous 
conclusion about the positive relation between uncertainty and R&D investment, these 
results show that firms with high idiosyncratic volatility will invest more in R&D. The t-
statistics of coefficients of idiosyncratic volatilities in model 1 (column 1) and 2 (column 
2) are greater than 6. Moreover, idiosyncratic volatility is significantly correlated with the 
change in R&D investments measured by the ratio of R&D to sales.  
As documented in literature (e.g. Pastor and Veronnesi (2006 and 2009)), firms in high 
tech industries tend to have higher specific volatility. Thus, the positive relation between 
a firm’s idiosyncratic risk and R&D investments may depend on the firms in these 
industries. To eliminate this possible explanation, I will exclude the firms in high tech 
industries and examine the effects of firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on its investment 
policies.  
Table 29 shows the results of the regression of firm’s investments on its idiosyncratic 
volatility and other characteristics for non-high tech firms. Consistent with the previous 
results, table 29 presents that firms tend to invest more in R&D when their specific risk is 
high. The t-statistics of this coefficient are larger than 10 which are much larger than 
these statistics in tables 20, 21 and 24. Together with the previous results, this evidence 
shows that less innovative firms tend to invest more in R&D when their uncertainty is 
high in order to maintain and enhance their competitive advantage. 
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Table 29: Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility and Corporate Investments for Firms in Non- high tech Industries 
 
 Rd/(cap+rd) i,t Rd/(cap+rd) i,t investi,t investi,t rdini,t rdini,t 
       
Vol i,t-1 2.997***  -0.798***  7.300***  
 (45.22)  (-12.95)  (46.71)  
Cvol i,t-1  1.003***  -1.040***  0.847*** 
  (12.77)  (-14.40)  (4.58) 
logq i,t-1 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.228*** 0.200*** 
 (79.09) (70.19) (86.92) (92.34) (97.86) (88.47) 
logk i,t-1 0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 0.011*** -0.030*** 
 (11.15) (-16.20) (-11.93) (-6.40) (6.81) (-22.71) 
cfkl i,t-1 -0.006*** -0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.031*** -0.033*** 
 (-25.45) (-29.09) (13.21) (14.11) (-51.31) (-55.17) 
bea i,t-1 0.202*** 0.179*** -0.009 -0.004 0.421*** 0.360*** 
 (34.52) (30.51) (-1.57) (-0.76) (30.35) (25.95) 
yret i,t-1 -0.032*** -0.024*** 0.037*** 0.034*** -0.044*** -0.026*** 
 (-21.48) (-16.18) (27.07) (25.22) (-12.54) (-7.46) 
_cons -0.043*** 0.010 0.189*** 0.174*** -0.331*** -0.204*** 
 (-6.44) (1.49) (30.11) (28.09) (-20.73) (-12.89) 
N 58,283 58,283 58,683 58,683 58,683 58,683 
R
2
 0.1832 0.1828 0.2116 0.2116 0.2670 0.2667 
 
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression model 2 for firms in non-high tech industries. Rd/(cap+rd) i,t is the ratio of R&D investments to 
total investments. Investi,t is the capital investment ratio which is the value of capital expenditures to replacement costs and rdini,t is the ratio of R&D 
investments to replacement costs. Vol i,t-1 is a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility in year t-1. Cvol i,t-1 is the change in idiosyncratic volatility for firm i from 
year t-2 to t-1. logq is log of Tobin’s Q, cfkl is the ratio of operating income to cost of capital, bea is the book equity ratio, and yret  is yearly stock 
returns. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1%, 




This essay examines the effects of a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility on its investment 
policies. While the negative relation between a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and its 
capital investments is largely documented in the literature on irreversible investments and 
real options (e.g. Pindyck (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), and on managerial risk 
aversion behavior (Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)), the effects of a firm’s uncertainty 
on its R&D investments are widely neglected (e.g. Bloom (2007)).  
Using the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns to proxy for uncertainty, I find that a 
firm usually invests more in R&D when uncertainty is high. As a result, a firm’s R&D 
investment proportion is significantly correlated with its idiosyncratic volatility. I further 
hypothesize that the positive relation between a firm’s uncertainty and its R&D 
investments is caused by the incentives to maintain and enhance its competitive 
advantage. As documented in the literature (e.g. Eberhart et al. (2004), and Lin (2012)), 
R&D investments usually result in new technological progress and typically increase the 
productivity of the firm’s physical investments. This investment also generates more 
growth opportunities and will bring long-term benefits to a firm. Beyond these benefits, I 
document that an increase in R&D investments will also reduce a firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk in subsequent years following its investments. My results are consistent with the 
strategic growth option framework. 
I also find that this positive relation is more pronounced for firms with the high 
incentives to maintain and enhance its competitive advantage; such as less innovative 
firms or firms in more competitive industries. I further document that large firms who are 
less innovative (e.g. Seru (2010), and Phillips and Zhdanow (2012)) will invest more in 
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R&D when their idiosyncratic volatility is high. Finally, my evidence shows that these 
incentives, which are neglected in the current literature on the effects of uncertainty on 
corporate investments, are important forces scholars must examine in order to better 
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